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The purpose of this MBA project is to identify the actual cost savings when a 
Performance Based Logistics (PBL) contract, with incentives, is awarded to replace a 
specified maintenance echelon for critical components or subcomponents of systems.  We 
will examine the impact on system availability to determine if a proposed investment will 
be practical. The entire logistics flow and maintenance processes, to include all 
associated sub-activities, will be analyzed. In order to do this, we must initially identify 
all costs of operating the current organic maintenance echelon, which will become the 
PBL baseline.  This will be used to determine the value added of any incremental 
percentage change in readiness or elimination of organic maintenance echelon(s).  We 
propose to develop a simulation based decision support tool to assist Program Managers 
(PM) with issues of valuing options for the improvement of system availability, and 
making appropriate investment options.  Ultimately, this project will determine the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
For years the Department of Defense (DoD) has been plagued with legacy system 
support for aging weapon systems that are in use far longer than they were ever designed.  
Costs for weapon systems that had far outlived their original life estimate reached an all 
time high in 1998.  The DoD calculated that annually it spends about $59 billion on 
logistics support to operate and sustain weapon systems.1  Beginning in FY 1998, in 
response to DoD direction, the services began implementing logistics support strategies 
that rely on the private sector to provide most of the support that the government 
traditionally provided.2  A number of logistics support strategies were undertaken all 
designed to transform its logistics infrastructure.  The specifics of each initiative were 
centered on a few key elements.  The most important elements are to reduce total life-
cycle cost of the program and improve customer support.  The best way to accomplish 
these two elements was to focus on the reliability, maintainability, availability and 
affordability of spare parts. 
Traditionally, product acquisition and sustainment acquisition have been separate 
and not necessarily equal concerns.3   This type of thinking has led to an environment 
that creates significant supportability issues within weapons programs that typically span 
decades.  For the government to maximize performance for the life of the system then the 
traditional way of looking at acquisition must change to a system that looks at logistics 
up front and early within the acquisition cycle.  This is especially true since it has been 
estimated that about 30 percent of all dollars spent are used to acquire the system, while 
the remaining 70 percent of all dollars are used for support.4 
                                                 
1 GAO Report No. GAO-01-23, “Prices of Navy Aviation Spare Parts Have Increased,” November 6, 
2000. 
2 Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General Report No. D-2003-120, “F/A-18 E/F 
Integrated Readiness Support Teaming Program,” August 8, 2003. 
3 Berkowitz Gupta Simpson and McWilliams (Dec 2004-Mar2005). “Defining and Implementing 
Performance-Based Logistics in Government”, Defense AR Journal. Fort Belvoir, V. 11(3) pp.254-268. 
4 Ibid 
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Understanding that there was a need for an improved acquisition strategy the 
Department of Defense introduced Performance Based Service Acquisition under the 
Defense Acquisition Reform of 2000.  The guiding principle is if an outside contractor 
can provide a service to the government more effectively than it can be obtained within 
the service (organically) then the government should enter into contract with them.  
Instead of providing requirements to be met in the form of specifications the government 
should only spell out the desired outcome in the form of a performance measurement.  
This process allows the contractor to determine the best way to accomplish the task.  This 
process often times leads to a reduction in cost and product innovations.   
Performance Based Logistics is an extension of Performance Based Service 
Acquisition with a focus on the complete logistics service for weapon systems.  The 
current manual that DoD uses as a guide is called Performance-Based Logistics: A 
Program Manager’s Product Support Guide.   
This guide defines PBL as: 
Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) is the preferred Department of 
Defense product support strategy to improve weapon system readiness by 
procuring performance, which capitalizes on integrated logistics chains 
and public/private partnerships.  The cornerstone of PBL is the purchase 
of weapon system sustainment as an affordable, integrated package, based 
on output measures such as weapon system availability, rather than input 
measures, such as parts and technical services.  The Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR) and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) directed the 
application of PBL to new and legacy weapon systems.  PBL 
Implementation is also mandated by DoD Directive 5000.1  
This guidebook, commonly referred to as the “PBL Guidebook”, was recently 
released in November 2004 and was developed as a result of the lessons learned from 
existing Department of Defense PBL programs. The first PBL guidebook was released 
three years earlier and contained far less specifics on how Program Managers (PM’s) 
should implement PBL and how they should develop PBL strategies for their Program 
Office.  The new guidebook provides all the necessary references and links to the most 
recent DoD directives, associated instructions and regulations that PM’s will need.  It 
clearly lays out PBL and provides the necessary tools to the PM on what steps are 
necessary for implementing and asses PBL within DoD Program Offices. However, that 
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was not the case when the services began implementing logistics support strategies that 
relied on private sector to provide most of the support that the Government traditionally 
provided.  
One well documented case is the Navy’s initiative with Boeing Company 
(Boeing) to manage the initial purchase and replenishment of 519 repairable parts and 
5,856 consumable parts for the F/A-18E/F aircraft.  The PBL initiative was called F/A-
18E/F Integrated Readiness Support Teaming Program (FIRST) which was signed on 
May 9, 2001.   The five year contract was designed to be a one stop shop for the Program 
Manager.  Never before had this type of contract at this magnitude been undertaken.  The 
Business Case Analysis that was used to justify the contract award claimed that Boeing 
would save the U.S. Navy $1.4 billion over 30 years, reduce turn around time (TAT) 
from 60 days to 45 days on repairs, and increase aircraft reliability (flight time between 
unscheduled removals) by 10 percent.5   However, these claims have proven to be 
inaccurate.    
The Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General published a report 
dated August 8, 2003 discussing the initiative with Boeing.  The report concluded “The 
Navy BCA used to justify the award of the FIRST contract over stated the cost of DoD 
performance.”6   As a result the FIRST program is estimated to cost $ 142.8 million7 
more than traditional support would have cost if the contract was not entered into. 
Performance-Based Logistics has been mandated by the Department of Defense in 
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Joint Vision 2020 and is here to stay.  The 
current PBL Guidebook clearly lays out PBL and provides the necessary tools to the PM 
on what steps are necessary for implementing PBL within DoD Program Offices but still 
lacks a proven methodology for determining costs of organic support.  This leads to a 
clear problem across the services on how to accurately determine what the actual cost of 
organic maintenance support is.  Clearly the FIRST Program has many lessons that can 
be learned and applied to future PBL incentives.  But until a methodology is developed to 
                                                 
5 Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General Report No. D-2003-120, “F/A-18 E/F 
Integrated Readiness Support Teaming Program,” August 8, 2003. 
6 Ibid, pg 4 
7 Ibid 
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actually determine cost savings it will be nearly impossible to know what incentives are 
worth under a PBL contract. 
   
B. PURPOSE 
Develop a simulation based decision support tool to assist Program Managers 
(PM) with issues of valuing options for the improvement of system availability, and 
making appropriate investment options.  This tool will be used to identify the actual cost 
savings when a Performance Based Logistics (PBL) contract, with incentives, is awarded 
to replace a specified maintenance echelon for critical components or subcomponents of 
systems.  This research will examine the impact on system availability to determine if a 
proposed investment will be practical. The entire logistics flow and maintenance 
processes, to include all associated sub-activities, will be analyzed. In order to do this, we 
must initially identify all costs of operating the current organic maintenance echelon, 
which will become the PBL baseline.  This will be used to determine the value added of 
any incremental percentage change in readiness or elimination of organic maintenance 
echelon(s).  Ultimately, this research project will determine the financial viability and 
practicality of implementing a PBL incentive contract. 
    
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since there is no standard DoD Total Life Cycle Cost Model that can determine 
the costs associated with PBL incentives, how can program managers accurately compute 
the value additive (i.e., in terms of dollars and Operational Availability (Ao)) when sub-
component reliabilities or logistics support elements change?  
  
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Scope 
 This report focuses on the affect, in terms of dollars and Operational Availability 
(Ao), when assessing the potential application of a PBL strategy.  Three realistic PBL 
scenarios were developed and analyzed with focus primarily on cost savings and Ao.  
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Each scenario examines the affect on Life Cycle Cost (LCC) and or Ao when the PBL 
strategy is to: 
1. Outsource an organic (i.e., Operational (O-level), Intermediate (I-
level) or Depot (D-level) maintenance echelon. 
2. Incentivize the contractor to improve the Mean Time Between Failure 
(MTBF) through redesign of the system, subsystem, or major 
assembly level. 
3. Reduce the Turn Around Time (TAT) (i.e., total time it takes for the 
part to return to the system once removed).   
 
2. Methodology 
This project developed and used an Arena simulation based model, and two 
Microsoft Excel flexible Total Life Cycle Cost Models that can compute the value 
additive (i.e. in terms of dollars and Ao) when sub-component reliabilities or logistics 
support elements change.  Each scenario began with a baseline which became the 
standard throughout the research project.  The U.S. Army’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) Shadow System was used to populate the models.  Quantitative data was assumed 
for MTBF and price per item. However, each scenario used the same assumed data.  The 
Arena simulation model was used to reflect the contribution of an incremental increase in 
MTBF to the system’s Ao.  The Excel model was used to reflect the financial justification 
to determine the value of improved reliability.  Each scenario was analyzed and 
compared to the baseline to determine the point of diminishing returns for investing in the 
improvement of reliability.     
 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This report is organized into five chapters.  Chapter II includes literature reviews 
on Naval Aviation Maintenance, PBL and the Boeing FIRST contract.  Chapter III 
discusses the Excel TLCC model and the Arena simulation model and their potential as a 
PM decision support tool.  Chapter IV analyzes the three PBL scenarios and discusses the 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. NAVAL AVIATION MAINTENANCE PROGRAM 
To fully understand the PBL scenarios it is necessary to understand the Naval 
Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP), performance improvement and the seven 
performance elements, the three levels of maintenance and the type of maintenance that is 
done at each level.  These paragraphs are excerpts from the recently released Commander 
Naval Air Force (COMNAVAIRFOR) Instruction 4790.2 Volume I, dated 1 February 
2005.   
The objective of the NAMP is to achieve and continually improve material 
readiness and safety standards established by the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO)/COMNAVAIRFOR, with coordination from the Commandant of the Marine 
Corp, with optimum use of manpower, material, and funds.  COMNAVAIRFOR aviation 
material readiness standards include: 
• Repair of aeronautical equipment and material at that level of maintenance 
which ensures optimum economic use of resources. 
• Protection of weapon systems from corrosive elements through the 
prosecution of an active corrosion control program. 
• Application of a systematic planned maintenance program and the collection, 
analysis, and use of data in order to effectively improve material condition 
and safety. 
The methodology for achieving the spirit and intent of the NAMP objective is 
labeled “performance improvements.”  New or improved cost effective 
capabilities and processes must be continuously pursued.  Mutually supporting 
teamwork, constant communication, and compatible measures are critical 
elements for success.  Performance improvements must be targeted to 
accomplish the following broad goals: 
• Increased readiness. 
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• Improved quality. 
• Improved deployability. 
• Improved sustainability. 
• Reduced Costs. 
• Enhanced preparedness for mobilization, deployability, and contingency 
operations. 
• Enhanced supply availability 
• Improved morale and retention 
• Compliance with environmental laws, rules, and regulations. 
1. Performance Improvement 
To realize continuous gains, performance improvements must be fully understood 
and actively managed.  As new techniques and concepts evolve, they must be evaluated 
and then implemented if found to be sound.  Before performance improvements can be 
successfully managed, all performance elements must be defined.  The seven 
performance elements are defined as follows: 
• Productivity – The pivotal element of the seven performance elements in that 
it is highly interrelated with all the elements.  Productivity must always be 
viewed in terms of its impact on effectiveness, efficiency, quality, innovation, 
quality of work life, and budgetability.  Productivity relates the outputs 
created by a system to the inputs required to create those outputs, as well as 
the transformation process of inputs to outputs.  Inputs in the form of 
personnel, skills, material, Ready for Issue (RFI) and non-RFI components, bit 
and piece parts, equipment, Support Equipment (SE), hand tools, methods, 
technical publications, directives, data, environment, facilities, funding, and 
energy are brought into the system.  These inputs are transformed into outputs 
(i.e., Ready for Tasking aircraft, RFI components, manufactured goods, 
inspection and calibration services) which are vital in providing necessary 
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maintenance and logistic support to achieve and sustain naval aircraft 
readiness. 
• Effectiveness – A function of the outputs, tells us how well goals are 
achieved.  For example, in Intermediate Maintenance Activities (IMA’s) it is 
how well we repair the right things at the right time to ensure maximum 
readiness is achieved.  In squadrons, it is how well assigned aircraft can 
perform their mission. 
•  Efficiency – The relationship between actual and planned resources.  
Efficiency describes how well the resources were used, as in manpower 
utilization. 
• Quality – The degree of satisfaction in a product or service as determined by 
the customer.  Fit, form, function, reliability, maintainability, consistency, and 
uniformity are some characteristics affected by quality. 
•  Innovation – The creativity applied to the transformation process, for 
example, development of new repair processes. 
• Quality of Work Life – A function of morale and other factors which affect 
personnel pride and motivation. 
• Budgetability – The ability to perform the assigned mission within allotted 
resources. 
2. Three Levels of Maintenance 
The NAMP is founded upon the three-level maintenance concept and is the 
authority governing management of O-level, I-level, and D-level aviation maintenance.  
It provides the management tools required for efficient and economical use of personnel 
and material resources in performing maintenance.  It also provides the basis for 
establishing standard organizations, procedures, and responsibilities for the 
accomplishment of all maintenance on naval aircraft, associated material, and equipment.  
Dividing maintenance into three levels allows management to: 
 
 10
• Classify maintenance functions by level.  
• Assign responsibilities for maintenance functions to a specific level. 
• Assign maintenance tasks consistent with the complexity, depth, scope, 
and range of work to be performed. 
• Accomplish any particular maintenance task or support service at a level 
which ensures optimum economic use of resources. 
• Collect, analyze, and use data to assist all levels of NAMP management. 
a. Organizational Level Maintenance 
O-level maintenance is performed by an operating unit on a day-to-day 
basis in support of its own operations.   The O-level maintenance mission is to maintain 
assigned aircraft and aeronautical equipment in a full mission capable status while 
continually improving the local maintenance process.  While O-level maintenance may 
be done by I-level of D-level activities, O-level maintenance is usually accomplished by 
maintenance personnel assigned to aircraft reporting custodians.  O-level maintenance 




• On equipment corrective and preventative maintenance. (i.e., on-equipment 
repair, removal, and replacement of defective components.) 
• Incorporation of Technical Directives (TDs), less SE, within prescribed 
limitations. 
• Record keeping and reports preparation. 
• Age Exploration (AE) of aircraft and equipment under Reliability Centered 
Maintenance (RCM). 
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b. Intermediate Level Maintenance 
The I-level maintenance mission is to enhance and sustain the combat 
readiness and mission capability of supported activities by providing quality and 
timely material support at the nearest location with the lowest practical resource 
expenditure.  I-level maintenance consists of on and off equipment material 
support and may be grouped as follows: 
• Performance of maintenance on aeronautical components and related SE. 
• Field Cognizant Activities (FCAs), which perform I-level calibration of 
designated equipment. 
• Processing aircraft components from stricken aircraft. 
• Incorporation of TDs. 
• Manufacture of selected aeronautical components, liquids and gases. 
• Performance of on-aircraft maintenance when required. 
• AE of aircraft and equipment under RCM. 
c. Depot Level Maintenance 
D-level maintenance is performed at or by naval activities industrial 
establishments to ensure continued flying integrity of airframes and flight systems during 
subsequent operation service periods.  D-level maintenance is also performed an material 
requiring major overhaul or rebuilding of parts, assemblies, subassemblies, and end 
items.  It includes manufacturing parts, modifying, testing, inspecting, sampling, and 
reclamating.  D-level maintenance supports O-level and I-level maintenance by providing 
engineering assistance and performing maintenance beyond their capabilities.  D-level 
maintenance functions may be grouped as follows: 
• Aircraft Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) (standard and rework) 
• Rework and repair of engines, components and SE. 
• Calibration by Navy calibration laboratories and Navy Standard Primary 
Laboratories. 
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• Incorporation of TDs. 
• Modification of aircraft, engines, and SE. 
• Technical and engineering assistance by field teams. 
• AE of aircraft and equipment under RCM. 
3. Maintenance Types 
Rework and upkeep are the two types of aircraft maintenance performed within 
the naval establishment without distinction as to levels of maintenance. 
• Rework – Rework may be performed on aircraft or equipment.  It is 
performed by industrial type activities assigned the mission, task, or 
functional responsibility of providing maintnenance program support.  
Rework is performed with military and civilian personnel and managed by 
Commander Naval Air Systems Command. 
• Upkeep – Upkeep is performed on aircraft or equipment.  It is performed by 
military and contractor personnel and is managed by the Aircraft Controlling 
Custodians (ACCs). 
 
B. PERFORMANCE BASED LOGISTICS 
1. Introduction 
The PBL approach is the preferred product support strategy within the DoD.  The 
DoD is implementing PBL in both new acquisition programs and legacy programs.  All 
Services are executing PBL policy at the system, subsystem, and component level.  The 
services are also working in conjunction with each other to implement PBL on joint 
programs.  Performance based logistics provides the logistic manager a way to increase 




a. Performance Based Logistics within Department of Defense 
Implementation of PBL was mandated in September, 2001 in the 
Quadrennial Defense Review, and initial guidance was issued by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD).8  The OSD issued a Product Support Guide that provided a 
strategy for executing PBL.9  Subsequently, each of the Services provided 
implementation guidance to their programs.10  In accordance with the Fiscal Year 2003 
Defense Policy Guidance, the scope of the programs to be considered for PBL 
implementation included all new systems and all Acquisition Category (ACAT) I and II 
fielded systems.11  The importance of sustainment in the program life cycle and in 
implementing PBL was recognized.  To ensure the requisite priority on sustainment 
issues within program offices and to ease PBL implementation efforts, the concept of 
Total Life Cycle Systems Management (TLCSM) was promulgated.12 
Total Life Cycle Systems Management emphasizes an early focus on sustainment 
in the program management office, making the PM responsible for all activities 
associated with the acquisition, development, production, fielding, sustainment, and 
disposal of a weapon system across its life cycle.  This was a significant paradigm shift 
from traditional program management that focused on the early phases (i.e., acquisition, 
development, fielding) of the life cycle.13  To support the decision-making process in 
selecting organic and commercial support providers, OSD promulgated guidelines for 
                                                 
8 Aldridge, E. C. (2002,February 18). Performance-Based Logistics. Washington, DC: Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). 
9 Morales, D. K. (2001, November 6).  Product Support guide.  Washington, DC: Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). 
10 Bolton, C. M. (2002, April 1). Army implementation of Performance-Based Logistics (PBL).  
Washington, DC: Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). 
 Schnieder, P. A. (2002, April 26).  Department of the Navy Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) 
implementation plan. Washington, DC: Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics).  
11 Young, J. J., Jr. (2003, January 27).  Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) guidance document.  
Washington, DC: Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition). 
12 Aldridge, E. C. (2003, March 7). Total life cycle system management and performance-based 
logistics. Washington, DC: Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). 
13Devries, H. J (Dec 2004-Mar2005). “Performance-Based Logistic-Barriers and Enablers to Effective 
Implementation”, Defense AR Journal. Fort Belvoir, V. 11(3) pp.242-254.  
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conducting BCA.14  In addressing the performance metrics’ relationship to desired 
outcomes, OSD provided some common examples such as Ao and logistics footprint.15    
b. Navy Performance Based Logistics 
As a result of DoD direction, the Naval Inventory Control Point, 
Philadelphia has established a “performance-based” logistics program to meet the Naval 
Supply systems Command assigned goal for improving support, reducing infrastructure, 
and lowering the Navy’s weapon systems cost of ownership.16  During 2001 and 2002 the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) released two separate reports that addressed 
the rising costs of Navy aviation spare parts.  
Specifically, GAO reported that the prices customers paid for Navy-
managed parts had increased on average 12 percent from FY 1994 through 
FY 1999 and continued to rise on average 37 percent from FY1999 
through FY 2002 for three of the Navy’s weapon system, the H-53 
helicopter, the F/A-18, and AV-8B aircraft and their engines17   
The Navy had been well aware that there were issues with average costs increasing. Once 
DoD began to encourage Performance Based Acquisition the Navy quickly began 
evaluating different support solutions.  The Naval Air (NAVAIR) Program Office’s were 
looking at innovative ways to reduce the total ownership costs while meeting the Chief of 
Naval Operations readiness goals.  The NAVAIR F/A-18 Program Office established an 
overall goal to reduce F/A-18 E/F weapon system ownership costs by 20 percent and 
evaluated options for a total support solution.18   As part of the evaluation, NAVAIR 
performed a Trade Study Cost Analysis which was released in July of 1999.  This 
analysis looked at a teaming option with Boeing Aircraft who is the prime vendor for the 
F/A-18 aircraft.  This teaming arrangement is referred as the F/A-18E/F Integrated 
Readiness Support Teaming (FIRST) Program.  On May 9, 2001 NAVICP awarded 
                                                 
14 Wynne, M. N. (2004a, January 23).  Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) Business Case Analysis 
(BCA). Washington, DC: Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics).  
15 Wynne, M. N. (2004b, August 16).  Performance-Based Logistics: Purchasing using performance-
based criteria. Washington, DC: Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). 
16 Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General Report No. D-2003-120, “F/A-18 E/F 




Boeing a 5-year requirements-type contract that established the Navy teaming 
arrangement with Boeing.  One year later the Navy had awarded 51 aviation 
performance-based logistics contracts under the program and had another 45 
systems/items under evaluation.19 
C. F/A-18E/F INTEGRATED READINESS SUPPORT TEAM (FIRST) 
PROGRAM 
1. General 
The FIRST contract creates a teaming arrangement between industry and the 
United States Government to improve parts availability and aircraft reliability for the 
F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, with the overall goal of reducing Total Ownership Cost 
(TOC).  The primary methods for accomplishing this will be continuous logistics 
processing with reliability and maintainability improvements.  Boeing has management 
authority to meet system demand requirements, improve system/parts reliability and 
availability, and manage obsolescence.  Boeing is to independently manage a total 
logistics support program for the F/A-18 E/F.  Financial incentives are provided for 
innovation and efficiency to reduce the F/A-18 E/F TLCC.  This performance concept 
anticipates both logistics performance enhancements and cost of ownership benefits by 
leveraging proven commercial support concepts.20 
2. FIRST Program Structure 
The FIRST Program contract was a 5-year requirements-type contract with a 2-
year base period and included three successive 1-year price ceiling priced options.  The 
base period was a cost-plus-incentive-fee type contract with award fee provision based on 
performance requirements.21  The contract was designed to be a one stop shop for the 
Program Manager.  Never before had this type of contract at this magnitude been 
undertaken.  Boeing was contracted to not only procure the initial and replenishment of 
519 repairable parts and 5,856 consumable parts but to repair them as well.   
The contract gives Boeing responsibility for the support process for parts 
particular to the F/A-18E/F aircraft including responsibility for meeting 
                                                 
19 Ibid 
20 FIRST Contract, N00383-01-D-001H, 04 May 2001. 
21 Ibid 
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demand requirements, improving system and parts reliability and 
availability, and managing obsolescence.  Boeing also became the supply 
chain manager for those parts, including forecasting, parts management, 
transportation, distribution, and warehousing.22 
Additionally, Boeing subcontracted the majority of the repair work to the Naval 
Aviation Depot (North Island) so as to not be in violation of 2464, title 10, United 
States Code. 
4. NAVAIR and NAVICP Business Case Analysis 
Both NAVAIR and NAVICP performed business case analysis (BCA) to justify 
the teaming venture with Boeing.  In June 1999, NAVAIR prepared a BCA outlining the 
benefits that DoD would derive from the proposed teaming with Boeing.  The BCA 
compared the cost avoidance in seven different areas to the costs that would be incurred 
under the current organic system.  The BCA projected that the FIRST Program would: 
• Provide a total logistics cost avoidance of $1.4 billion over 30 years, 
• Reduce turnaround time from 60 days to 45 days on repairs, and 
• Increase aircraft reliability (flight time between unscheduled removals) by 10 
percent.23 
The majority of the cost avoidance was centered in two areas of the seven that were 
analyzed.  These areas were support equipment and supply support which represented 75 
percent of the $1.4 billion. 
Since Boeing had agreed to become the supply chain manager, to include parts 
management, transportation, distribution, and warehousing, then there should be a 
significant savings to the Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF).  To assist in determining 
what the savings might be NAVICP was asked to provide their own BCA over the 5-year 
contract that addressed costs associated with the supply support element.  Since NAVICP 
had not performed a BCA examining the costs associated with the supply support 
element a integrated process team was established.  This team consisted of Navy and 
contractor technical experts from Boeing and numerous other original equipment 
manufacturers.  The team provided expertise in areas such as inventory management, 
                                                 
22 Ibid 
23 FIRST Contract, N00383-01-D-001H, 04 May 2001. 
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contracting, repairs, engineering, and financial management.  The NAVICP BCA showed 
a $55.4 million cost avoidance to the NWCF (later adjusted to $52.4 million) and 
supported entering into a teaming arrangement for the F/A-18E/F aircraft.24 
The total reported FIRST program savings was $126.1 million in cost avoidance 
for material, operations, and non-supply support elements.  Table 1 summarizes the 
Navy’s reported 5-year cost avoidance.25 
FIRST Program Savings - Without Verses With FIRST 
                         (in millions of $)     
    Without With Cost Increase/ 
  Description  FIRST FIRST (Cost Avoidance) 
        
NAVICP BCA      
  Material Costs 779.0 771.5 (7.5) 
  Operations Costs 108.1 63.2 (44.9) 
Subtotal NWCF Costs 887.1 834.7 (52.4) 
        
NAVAIR BCA      
  Non-Supply Support 
Element 1,531.2 1,457.5 (73.7) 
TOTAL    2,418.3 2,292.2 (126.1) 
Table 1.   Estimation of Cost Avoidance for FIRST Program Contract 
On April 3, 2001, the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, 
Development and Acquisition) notified congress of the Navy’s intent to award Boeing a 
contract for total logistics support of the F/A-18E/F aircraft.26 
5. Actual Cost of FIRST Program as of August 2004 
Three years into the execution of the contract the Office of the Inspector General 
for the Department of Defense published a report that was highly critical of the Navy’s 
original BCA.  
The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense  (IG 
DoD) reports that the Navy BCA used to justify the award of the 
FIRST contract overstated the cost of DoD performance.  That 
condition occurred because the Navy BCA used: 
 
                                                 
24 Ibid 
25FIRST Contract, N00383-01-D-001H, 04 May 2001. 
26 Ibid 
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• Unreliable data to calculate in-house consumable and repairable 
item prices; 
• An outdated matrix to calculate in-house repair costs versus 
historical data from naval depots; 
• Savings associated with NAVICP cost recovery rates for 
obsolescence and net loss not justified; 
• Cost avoidances NAVAIR claimed relating to integrated logistics 
support elements not fully supported or justified; and 
• A nontraditional methodology to calculate the in-house cost of 
managing consumable items.27 
The Navy did attempt to implement PBL, but without a proven methodology to determine 
organic maintenance support costs the Navy was unable to accurately asses the true cost 
avoidance.  Additionally, at the time the BCA’s were being conducted the GAO reported 
that the Navy lacked an effective data system for collecting and analyzing information 
relevant to material cost and usage.28    As a result, the business case used to justify the 
FIRST contract for life-cycle support of the F/A-18E/F peculiar aircraft components 
overstated the cost of DoD performance.29  
The IG DoD was able to use real cost data to calculate the actual costs of 
NAVICP material costs without FIRST to be $573.8 million not the NAVICP estimate of 
$779.0 million over 5-years.  This overestimation of in-house costs has proved 
troublesome to the Navy.  Table 2 summarizes the IG DoD adjustments made to the 
Navy’s reported 5-year cost avoidance. 
                                                 
27 FIRST Contract, N00383-01-D-001H, 04 May 2001. 
28 GAO Report No. GAO-02-565, “Navy Needs Plan to Address Rising Prices in Aviation Parts,” 
May 31, 2002.  
29 Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General Report No. D-2003-120, “F/A-18 E/F 




IG DoD-Corrected FIRST Program Savings 
                     (in millions of $)     
    Without With Cost Increase/ 
  Description  FIRST FIRST (Cost Avoidance) 
        
NAVICP BCA      
  Material Costs 573.8 783.1 209.3  
  Operations Costs 119.5 63.2 (56.3) 
Subtotal NWCF Costs 693.3 846.3 153.0  
        
NAVAIR BCA      
  Non-Supply Support 
Element 1,531.2 1,521.0 (10.2) 
TOTAL    2,224.5 2,367.2 142.8  
Table 2.   IG DoD-Corrected FIRST Program Savings 
 
The Navy did not agree with either the findings or the recommendations.  The Navy 
believed it used an appropriate methodology to prepare its business case analysis for the 
FIRST Program and that the business case analysis initially used to justify award of the 
FIRST contract was fully justified.30 
                                                 
30 Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General Report No. D-2003-120, “F/A-18 E/F 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. BASELINE   
In order to answer our research question “How can program managers accurately 
compute the value additive (i.e., in terms of dollars and Operational Availability (Ao)) 
when sub-component reliabilities or logistics support elements change?”, three different 
scenarios were drafted in an attempt to determine if eliminating and outsourcing 
maintenance level activities of weapon systems or sub-components of a system affect the 
overall Total Life Cycle Cost (LCC), Reliability, and Ao.  To measure changes in LCC 
and Ao, spreadsheet and simulation models will be used for comparing several options.  
The spreadsheet model was used to reflect the financial justification to determine the 
value of improved reliability.  The simulation model was to be used to reflect the 
contribution of an incremental increase in Reliability to the system’s Ao.  However, 
before any comparison could be made, the first critical step was to determine a baseline.  
In this project, the current organic procedure for performing maintenance at any level or 
type will be considered the baseline scenario and which will be specifically annotated for 
each scenario in Chapter 4.  This baseline scenario will be used as the benchmark criteria 
for which other options will be evaluated against.  It is hoped that the analysis provided 
from this report will better assist Program Managers (PMs) in making sound decisions 
when options are being proposed. 
B. MODELS    
Three models were used in this project.  Two models using the Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet program as a decision support tool to calculate LCC of a weapon system.  
This spreadsheet was originally designed by Professor Keebom Kang of the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.  The original model was first used for the “Vertical 
(Take off and Landing) Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicle” (VTUAV) case study31 and was 
adopted for this project to further study actual UAV systems currently in use by the 
Department of Defense (DoD). 
                                                 
31 MBA VTUAV Case Study by Prof Keebom Kang, Logistics Engineering (GB 4410) Lecture Notes, 
Naval Postgraduate School,   Monterey, CA. 
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The first spreadsheet is called the “Large LCC” and focuses on the entire Life 
Cycle Cost structure which encompasses RDT&E, Production, System Components, and 
Operational Support functions such as Training, Manning, and Maintenance levels. The 
Large LCC spreadsheet will be used in Scenarios One and Two.   The second spreadsheet 
called the “Small LCC” focuses specifically on the Intermediate (I) Level Maintenance 
Activities.  While these spreadsheets concentrate on LCC and reliability, the third model 
uses a Simulation software package called “Arena”32 as a decision support tool for PMs 
to determine Ao of a weapon system.  Both the Small LCC and the Simulation Model will 
be used for Scenario Three. 
For the Large LCC spreadsheet model, data will be required to populate the 
sections on the User Input User page which consists of:   1) General, 2) Training, 3) 
Operational, 4) Manning, 5) Maintenance & Equipment, 6) RDT&E & Production, and 7) 
Component Inputs.  This User Input Page is linked to the other individual work pages for 
Manning, Training, RDT&E, O&M, and Totals.  The cells with black lettering are static 
figures that remain the same throughout each scenario but may be changed if required.  
The cells with RED lettering are input cells which require data.  This data are the 
dynamic figures that are used to compare the differences in LCC changes if any.  The 
cells with BLUE lettering are the computed figures by the model, such as LCC on the 
User Input page.  Once the Input page is populated, the other pages will automatically be 
updated with the same figures.  Key data requirements for the User Input page include 
“System Components” and “Sub-Components” that need to be identified as “Critical” or 
“Non-Critical.”  Other key data requirements are the cells in red letters such as the “Unit 
Cost”,  “Mean Time Between Failures” (MTBF), “Life Span” of the system in years, and 
“Manning Requirements” for each level of maintenance activity.  The Small LCC model 
uses the O&M data to populate the fields and follows the same color logic for each of the 
cells.   
For the simulation model, the key data requirements for the Input page are the 
section MTBFs of the weapon system.  For each section, the spare parts level and the 
                                                 
32 Kelton, David W., Randall P. Sadowski, and David T. Sturrock. Simulation With Arena, 3rd Ed.  
Boston:  McGrawHill, 2003. 
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“Turn Around Time” (TAT) is also used in the Ao calculation.  Transportation costs for 
each repair is the last variable that is needed to complete the calculation. 
C. DATA GATHERING   
To collect data for this project, the majority of the fields in the spreadsheet were 
adopted from Professor Kang’s original model analyzing a VTUAV.  The rest of the data 
was collected from an Army Program Office33 and a Navy Program Office34 through 
telephone calls, electronic mails (e-mail), and note taking.   
In order to apply this model to current UAV systems, the Army’s Shadow System 
was used to identify the system components and sub-components; system operational 
threshold and objective requirements; system manning levels including maintenance 
requirements; and operational hours. However, pertinent information such as MTBFs, 
unit cost, and identification of critical and non-critical items were not available from the 
Shadow system.  Instead, this information was retrieved from a UAV System currently 
under development for the U.S. Navy from the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR).  
The data gathered from the Navy UAV are either actuals or estimates.  Where the 
program office was unable to provide actual figures, best estimates were provided by 
NAVAIR to mirror close to actual figures.  These estimates were to be second best to 
actuals based by the group members.  Lastly, both the Army and Navy UAV systems 
only used the Two Level Maintenance Activities of Operational and Depot (O-D). 
D. ASSUMPTIONS 
Many assumptions were made for this project to expedite the case study.  
However, careful consideration was made to ensure assumptions fit close to standards 
and real life scenarios.  The areas where assumed figures were used are annotated in the 
following: 
- Large LCC Model User Input Page 
o General Inputs Data 
o Training Inputs Data 
o Operational Inputs – POL & Flt Hour costs only 
                                                 
33 Army Shadow UAV System (link or info). 
34 Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Program Office 
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-  Manning Inputs – I Level Only 
o Maintenance & Equipment – Test Equipment Cost, I Level Activation 
Cost, I Level Operating Cost/Year, Depot Repair Cost, and Transportation 
& Shipment Cost. 
o RDT&E & Production Input Data 
o I Level and Depot Level Repair costs 
 
o Component Input Data – Reliability Factors  
 HUMMER MTBF and Unit Cost 
 Power Generator Unit Cost 
 Launcher MTBF and Unit Cost 
 Parachute MTBF and Unit Cost 
- Training User Input Page – Required Funding for each level 
- RDT&E & Production Input Page 
- Spare Parts Critical Items having protection level of 95% 
- Spare Parts Non-Critical Items having protection level of 85% 
E. LIMITATIONS 
1. Limitations of the LCC Models  
The LCC calculations are only as good as the input data provided.  If actual data 
can be retrieved for every field, the LCC will be a true calculation.  Where data provided 
are estimated or assumed, the spreadsheet then only provides the best possible LCC (but 
not the exact LCC).  The spreadsheet proves to be valuable for LCC cost computation, 
but the computations are static in nature and does not account for the interactions 
between reliability, turn-around time, and Ao.  Specifically for this project, the 
spreadsheet does not capture the dynamic relationship between reliability and Operational 
Availability (Ao) which is defined as (MTBM)/(MTBM+MDT).  A decline in reliability 
will increase the frequency of failures.  This will result in an increased workload for the 
repair facility.  A bottleneck in the repair cycle may develop as the increased workload 
congests the facility’s operations.  This additional workload will further result in an 
increase in MDT and will adversely affect TAT. The spreadsheet model does not capture 
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this dynamic relationship, but the simulation model does.  Lastly, the spreadsheet also 
does not calculate Operational Availability.  
2. Limitations of the Simulation Model 
 The Arena Model on the other hand is able to capture the calculation of 
Operational Availability and the dynamic relationship between MTBM and MDT.  The 
limitation for this model is the same for the spreadsheet.  The User Inputs become a 
limitation as only this data is used strictly by the program to calculate Operational 
Availability.  The current set up of the model allows only for an MTBF input of the three 
sections of the UAV weapon system under ten different program runs.  An assumption 
had to be made of each sectional MTBF, which includes several subcomponents.  If the 
model was developed to include MTBFs of all the subcomponents of one section, then a 
more accurate assessment of the section MTBF could be determined.  Lastly, the 
simulation does not take cost into account.  Therefore, the spreadsheet model and 
simulation model complement each other for this project. 
F. APPLICATION 
Though these models were used specifically on the Army and Navy UAV systems 
only, these models can be used on any weapon system if the data can be retrieved.  Once 
complete and pertinent information of a desired weapon system is retrieved, the data 
could be entered into these models in lieu of the sections used for the baseline scenarios 
for the UAV system.  As soon as the data cells are filled, a baseline template model will 
be produced to use as a benchmark criteria to evaluate against any option available.  This 
tool equips the PM in making better sound judgments if a proposal by a contractor is 
being offered and ensures that a cost effective and reliable weapon system will be 
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IV. SCENARIO DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
Scenario Quick Reference Guide 
A.  Scenario One: Using Spreadsheet Model to Analyze Life Cycle Cost (LCC) p. 28 
1-a: Effects of Eliminating Intermediate (I) Level Maintenance p. 31 
1-b: Outsourcing Spare Parts Inventory and Transportation  
Management  
p. 33 
B.  Scenario Two: Using Spreadsheet Model to Analyze I-Level Outsourcing p. 36 
2-a: Effects of Outsourcing Single Critical Component on LCC p. 41 
2-b: Effects of Outsourcing Entire Weapon System to LCC p. 44 
C.  Scenario Three: Using Spreadsheet and Simulation Models to Analyze Reliability and Operational 
Availability (Ao) 
p. 47 
3-a: Valuing the Incentive to Improve Subcomponent Reliability p. 52 
3-b: The Effect Turn Around Time (TAT) Has on Total LCC p. 53 
Table 3.   Scenario Quick Reference Guide 
 In this chapter, the Army’s UAV Shadow System, described in detail in 
Appendix A, will be used in three different scenarios to be analyzed using two 
spreadsheet models and a simulation model.  All three models are available from 
http://web.nps.navy.mil/~mn4310/MBA_project/ Each scenario also offered two options 
for analytical comparisons against the baseline scenario.  For the first two scenarios, a 
spreadsheet tool called the “Large LCC” model was used to calculate the life cycle cost 
from research and development, operational deployment, through the disposal phase of a 
weapon system.  The LCCs from each of the options was compared to the LCC of the 
baseline scenario to show the effect on cost from these options.  While the first two 
scenarios computed LCCs of the weapons system, the third scenario used a second 
spreadsheet tool called the “Small LCC” and a simulation model.  The Small LCC 
analyzed the impact on inherent reliability had on Total LCC while the simulation model 
estimated Ao of a weapon system.  Additionally, the simulation model captured the 
dynamic relationship between reliability and Ao.  With the spreadsheet model capturing 
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LCC and the simulation model analyzing reliability and Ao, both models were key tools in 
analyzing the following scenarios.       
 
A. SCENARIO ONE 
Scenario 1:  During the development phase of a certain weapon system, a 
proposal to significantly increase the reliability of the weapon system is strongly being 
considered to reduce the logistical footprint of the system and the total Life Cycle Cost 
(LCC).  In addition to the increase in reliability, a change in traditional maintenance 
structure requirements is strongly being considered to further reduce the logistical 
footprint. One of the Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) programs is strongly being 
considered.  Assume the current maintenance structure for similar UAV systems is a 
5/75/20 split between Operational (O), Intermediate (I), and Depot (D) activities, 
respectively.  In this proposal, I-Level maintenance will be performed either at the O or D 
level maintenance activities. The argument is that with the absence of the I-Level 
maintenance activity, manpower, training requirements, and maintenance cost savings 
will significantly reduce the total life cycle cost of the system.  This proposal will 
evaluate two options (1-a. and 1-b.) with varying degrees of maintenance responsibility 
for the remaining activities. 
Scenario 1-a:  An option of 30/70 percent split among the O and D maintenance 
activities respectively is being proposed.  In order to achieve this plan, the reliability 
criteria for the design phase of the system must be decided in order to ensure the 
operational level, with the appropriate manning levels, will be capable of performing all 
additional maintenance.   Assuming the reliability criteria was established and the 
MBTFs are the same as those in the baseline scenario with a threshold-operating 
requirement of 12 continuous hours of operation on station in a 24-hour period.  The 
objective system will be capable of 18 continuous hours of operation on station in a 24-
hour period  
 (1).  Calculate the potential cost savings of O-D level maintenance in 
regards to the new manning levels, training requirements, and maintenance costs annually 
if this plan is to be executed.    
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 (2).  If I Level was not eliminated, but instead outsourced to a contractor, 
what should the PM be willing to pay for this service with the same level of reliability?  
Scenario 1-b: Another option calls for a 10/90 percent split among the O and D 
maintenance activities, respectively.  In addition to the contractor improving reliability 
for this system, the contractor also proposes to manage spare parts inventory and 
transportation.  To assist the PM in deciding annual cost for the proposed contract, what 
should be the allowable maximum annual cost for providing this additional proposed 
service with the same protection level performed organically? 
1. Scenario One Decision Support Tool Description 
Before attempting to isolate a component or subcomponent of a weapon system 
for improving reliability or reducing the logistical footprint to determine its relationship 
to maintenance and Life Cycle Cost (LCC), we now know that the first critical step is to 
determine the baseline scenario of the particular system.  Once the baseline scenario is 
determined, each individual cost section of General Information, Training, Operations, 
Manning, Maintenance & Equipment, RDT&E & Production, and Component 
information need to be identified in the LCC spreadsheet model as shown in Figure 1 
(Large LCC).  Now that the individual sections could be isolated in the base scenario, a 
comparison could be made to another option being recommended in lieu of the process or 
service currently being performed. 
For example, before deciding to eliminate or outsource any particular level of 
maintenance activity of a weapon system to a contractor, the PM needs to be able to 
compute at what cost the service should be willing to pay for a certain level of readiness.  
Without this capability, the PM will be unable to determine an accurate Cost Benefit 
Analysis.  The LCC spreadsheet model used in this project is a decision support tool that 
would significantly help the PM to make an educated Cost Benefit Analysis before 
making a decision if eliminating or outsourcing a particular service or maintenance will 
provide additional value to the program and overall system functionality. 
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2. Spreadsheet Decision Support Tool Application 
a. Traditional Maintenance Level Activities in Regards to Cost 
Before deciding to eliminate or outsource a particular maintenance level or 
activity, another important step is first determine the current costs of running this activity 
annually.  This current cost structure can be retrieved from the baseline scenario data 
produced in Figure 1 (Large LCC).   From this model, each of the three levels of 
maintenance activity’s cost structure can be isolated to determine the annual costs for 
each based on manning, training, and repair costs.   Additionally, the level of reliability is 
provided based on the annual cost.  With this information, a PM can view the current 
level of reliability being provided and current cost simultaneously.  If a contractor 
proposes to perform any level of maintenance for a targeted cost structure and level of 
reliability, the PM will be capable to perform an educated comparison using this 
spreadsheet decision tool support application between the contractor’s offer and what is 
currently being performed. 
b. The Effect on LCC by Eliminating I-Level Maintenance 
Activities 
(1)  Baseline for LCC Spreadsheet Model:  For Scenario One, 
Figure 1 will be used to reflect data for the base scenario.  First, the components of the 
system need to be identified, and then identified further as critical or non-critical items.  
The unit costs and Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) of each component also need to 
be identified.  Manning levels for all three maintenance activities and life span of the 
entire system are a few more necessary data required to populate the LCC spreadsheet 
model.  We will assume critical items will have a spare parts protection level of 95% and 
non-critical items as 85%.  The MTBFs, unit cost, as well as manning requirements are 
annotated in Figure 1.  After all the data is entered into Figures 1 through 1f, this will 
reflect the baseline scenario of this particular UAV system with LCC.  This figure 
includes cost from RDT&E, Production, Operational Support, and Disposal requirements 
throughout the life span of 20 years for this system. 
(2)  Calculating the Cost of I Level Maintenance Activity to LCC:  
For the PM to decide if the system should deviate from the traditional three levels of 
maintenance, it is critical to figure what the system’s current MTBF and cost structure is.  
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Specifically, the PM needs to identify the cost of operating the I Level Maintenance 
Activity annually.  From the annual I Level Cost column of Figure 1c (O&M Workbook 
Page) in Appendix B, the total cost for I Level Maintenance annually could be 
determined.  This amount is the baseline cost for performing I Level Maintenance and 
would be the potential cost savings for eliminating this particular level of maintenance.  
However, since the maintenance levels will be transferred to both O and D Levels, a cost 
comparison between the two could be done using this spreadsheet model to determine if 
the proposed cost savings could actually be achieved using the same level of reliability.   
In addition to identifying the cost of eliminating I level 
maintenance activities, Figure 1 could also be used as the baseline cost for outsourcing I 
level maintenance activities to contractors.  For example, with the current system level of 
reliability, along with the annualized cost to organically perform I level maintenance, the 
PM can now determine the cost ceiling for outsourcing I level maintenance for the same 
level of reliability.  Any dollar amount higher than this figure would not be cost effective, 
unless the contractor is able to provide a higher level of reliability. 
3.  Scenario One Model Analysis 
a. Scenario 1-a LCC Spreadsheet Model Analysis 
(1) Cleary, designing a system with improved reliability would 
reduce the logistical footprint and overall LCC.  However, how does a PM compare this 
strategy when one of the maintenance levels is being proposed to be eliminated?  From 
Figure 1 (base scenario), the LCC is determined to be $336,090,952 for a 20 year life 
span for this particular UAV system.  Manning cost is $605,000 annually while training 
cost is $345,000 annually for combined basic and intermediate levels of required training.  
O, I & D levels of maintenance totals equal $298,253 for maintenance costs annually 
which out of this $203,354 is I level maintenance alone.  Spare cost runs approximately 
$364,095 annually.  Comparing Figure 1 with Figure 1.1 (1-a. scenario) in Appendix B, 
the new LCC is only $311,459,139 for the 20 year life span with I Level Maintenance 
eliminated.  Furthermore, the $605,000 annual cost for manning and the $126,000 annual 
cost for training are eliminated.  O & D level maintenance cost annually now increases to 
$343,443 for two levels of maintenance and spare cost also increases to $374,595 
annually.  With an overall Total LCC savings of $24,631,813 for this particular UAV 
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system, the PM can make a sound decision that partaking of the proposed maintenance 
strategy will provide cost savings to the program while maintaining the same level of 
subcomponent reliability.      
(2) In addition to the cost savings of eliminating I level 
maintenance, the PM also has the capability of determining if outsourcing I level 
maintenance would be a good option.  With this spreadsheet model, the annual savings 
could be calculated to determine at what cost the annual I level maintenance should be 
outsourced.  For the cost of operating I level maintenance activities annually, manning 
cost is at $605,000; training cost is at $345,000; while repairs cost is at $203,354.  In 
total, I level maintenance cost is $1,153,354 annually.   This annual cost over the 20 year 
life cycle of the UAV system accounts for $35,718,454.  If a contractor proposes to 
perform the I level maintenance for the entire 20 years of the UAV system, the PM is 
now better informed that the contract should be less than $35,718,454.  If a contractor 
proposes a dollar more for the same level of readiness, the PM can smartly reject the 
offer, or be better prepared to negotiate for improved level of reliability. 
b. Scenario 1-a Conclusion 
From the spreadsheet model analysis, it is safe to assume that deviating 
from the traditional three level maintenance activities of O-I-D to two levels of O-D 
provides the program office significant cost savings without reductions in reliability to 
the overall system functionality for this particular UAV system.  It is also important to 
note that the MTBFs of each of the subcomponents used in the baseline scenario were the 
same for this scenario.  Hence, it is also safe to assume to expect more cost savings in the 
system’s LCC if the MTBFs were improved for all or some of the system’s 
subcomponents in this scenario.  The only area in which cost did not decrease was in the 
annual spare cost, repair cost, and transportation cost calculations.  However, to further 
improve cost savings, the PM is now able to focus further in alternative options in 
performing spare parts inventory and transportation management to further cut down 
costs while keeping the same level of reliability for the entire system.   Whether the PM 
has a choice of eliminating or outsourcing any level of maintenance activities, this 
spreadsheet model may prove to be a very useful tool when it comes to determining the 
effects on LCC of any weapon system.   For example, if the contractor is able to perform 
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the I Level Maintenance Activity for $1,153,354 annually, we should expect improved 
reliability in this service.  If reliability of the system would not change from outsourcing, 
we should expect to budget less than $1,153,354 annually for this service and nothing 
more. 
c. Scenario 1-b LCC Spreadsheet Model Analysis 
For scenario 1-b., three scenarios will be compared for spare parts and 
transportation costs on an annual basis.  The first will be the baseline scenario using data 
from Figure 1.  The second will be from scenario 1-a. using data from Figure 1.1 (30/70 
O-D split) in Appendix B.  The third will use data from Figure 1.2 (Appendix B) which 
portrays the data for this particular scenario. 
The baseline scenario’s spare parts cost is $364,095 and transportation 
cost is $30,600 annually, to equal $394,695.  For scenario 1-a., spare parts cost is 
$374,595 and transportation is $30,600 annually, to equal $405,195.  For this particular 
scenario, spare parts cost $416,997 and transportation cost is at a steady $30,600 
annually, to equal $447,597.  There is an obvious upward trend from the baseline 
scenario to 1-b.  The difference between the baseline and 1-a is -$10,500.  The difference 
between the baseline and 1-b is -$52,902.  The difference between scenarios 1-a and 1-b 
is -$42,402.  If a contractor proposes to manage spare parts inventory and transportation 
with the O, I, & D structure still in place, then the PM utilizing this model would know to 
spend less than $394,695 annually.  Under the O-D maintenance structure (30/70 split), 
the PM would know to spend less than $405,195 annually.  Lastly, the PM would know 
to spend less than $447,597 annually to contract out the management of spare parts 
inventory and transportation under the O-D maintenance structure with a 10/90 split.  For 
each of the figures provided, the PM may accept a higher cost annually only if the level 
of reliability could be improved significantly. 
d. Scenario 1-b Conclusion 
As previously discussed, changing from three levels of maintenance to O-
D has potential cost savings, however, spare parts cost increases.  Shifting to the 10/90 
split in O-D further increases the annual cost in spare parts management.  In making a 
decision to outsource spare parts management and transportation, the PM may provide 
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additional incentives for the contractor to improve spare parts inventory.  For example, if 
spare parts inventory costs could be decreased significantly by the contractor then the 
savings could be split between the two as long as reliability and protection levels remain 
the same.  Additionally, cost savings incentives for improving transportation costs and 
Turn-Around-Time (TAT) (which will be discussed in the next scenario) could also be 
another option.  Overall, the take-away from this scenario is that this spreadsheet model 
is a very helpful tool to isolate potential cost driving areas such as spare parts inventory 
and transportation.  Once this area is identified, the PM can request for options to further 




Figure 1.   Baseline Scenario (User Inputs Page)
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Scenario Two will continue using the “Large LCC” model.  However, 
instead of eliminating I-Level completely the model will be used to evaluate how 
outsourcing I-Level, for an individual component or for the entire UAV system, affects 
LCC.  Multiple variables will be changed to show the complex relationship between each 
of them.  This scenario will show the difficulties that a PM has in determining if a PBL 
initiative should be entered and what the incentive is worth if achieved by the OEM.   
B. SCENARIO TWO 
Scenario 2:  A PM is considering a PBL contract to outsource the I-Level 
maintenance activity to the Original Equipment Manager (OEM) of a UAV system.  It 
must be decided if the outsourcing of the I-Level maintenance activity will be for the 
entire weapon system or only a critical subcomponent of the weapon system.  An analysis 
on reliability, TAT (i.e, Sum of test and check time, repair time and transportation time), 
training costs, labor costs (i.e., manpower reduction and contract labor vs. organic labor), 
I-Level facility costs and the impact on LCC will be used to determine which option will 
be the better investment.  A system consists of four UAV’s and maintains an operational 
capacity of 125 hours per weapon system a month. 
Scenario 2-a. A contract proposes that the I-level maintenance activity be 
outsourced for a single critical component.  The PM has determined that the UAV 
Engine, with a MTBF of 1,187 hours, is the most critical component.  Currently, when a 
subsystem fails, it is sent to the service’s organic I-Level for repair.  The TAT for organic 
I-Level repair is 20 days.  Under the proposed contract the I-Level would not repair the 
engine but would maintain an Engine Test Facility for Test and Check and minor 
calibration adjustments. If the engine is found to be in need of repair then it would be 
shipped to the OEM for repair and returned to inventory once the repair was completed.  
The PM has estimated that the elimination of the repair function at the organic I-Level 
will reduce junior E-1 to E-6 manpower from five technicians to two.  Additionally, the 
basic training time for the remaining E-1 to E-6 technicians will be reduced from 20 
weeks to ten weeks. 
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The OEM proposes to improve MTBF to 1,500 hours through system redesign.  
Due to the increased time for the system to be tested at the organic I-Level and shipped to 
and from the I-Level rework facility at the OEM the TAT for repair and transportation 
will increase to 30 days.  The warehousing of inventory spares and delivery to the end 
user will remain with the Service.  The OEM contractor will be required to maintain the 
same spare part protection level of 95 percent on station. The PM understands that by 
increasing the TAT, and requiring the OEM contractor to maintain a 95 percent 
protection level of spares, that there will be an possible increase in costs associated with 
the need to carry additional spares on station.  
(1)  Will the reduction in training and personnel costs be greater than the increase 
in spare part inventory costs?   
(2)  If so then, this savings amount will be the maximum amount that the PM 
would be willing to pay for outsourcing the engine to the OEM. 
(3)  If the OEM demonstrates a 313 hour increase in MTBF of the engine what 
will the monetary incentive be for that increase?  
Scenario 2-b. Under this option, the PM will outsource the I-Level maintenance 
activity of an entire weapon system.  Currently, when a subsystem fails, it is sent to the 
service’s organic I-Level for repair.  The PM has determined that the service’s organic I-
Level has an operating cost of $6 million per year, manning is at seven personnel and the 
cost for each repair is $3,000.  Additionally, the TAT for organic I-Level repair is 20 
days.  
Under the proposed contract the OEM proposes to occupy the service’s I-Level 
spaces on the military installation which will be used as their maintenance site.  All 
maintenance will be performed by OEM personnel using the existing test equipment.  
The OEM proposes to reduce TAT at the I-Level to ten days, reduce manning at the I-
Level by one person and reduce working hours at the facility by 50 percent.  These 
reductions are estimated to lower I-Level facility operating costs by 20 percent annually.  
However, the cost for each repair will double from $3,000 to $6,000 due to the increase 
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in skilled labor and the annual cost for one OEM maintenance person will equal that of an 
officer (i.e., $120,000 per year). 
 (1)  Will the reduction in TAT, facility operating cost, organic manning and 
training be greater than the increase in repair costs and manning salary?   
(2)  If so then, this savings will be a monetary incentive for the OEM to maintain 
a TAT of 10 days.  
1. Scenario Two Decision Support Tool Analysis 
Before a PM can make a decision to outsource the entire I-Level maintenance 
activity to the OEM or outsource just a critical component the baseline scenario must be 
determined.  Once the baseline scenario is determined, each individual cost section of 
RDT&E, Procurement, Operational Support, and Disposal can be identified in the LCC 
spreadsheet model as shown in Figure 1 (Large LCC).  These individual cost sections can 
be isolated in the base scenario and a comparison can be made between the two options to 
determine which one will provide the greatest LCC savings over the life of the program.  
The LCC spreadsheet model used in this project is a decision support tool that would 
significantly help the PM to make an educated Cost Benefit Analysis before making a 
decision if outsourcing the entire I-Level maintenance or just a critical component will 
provide additional value to the program and overall system functionality. 
2. Spreadsheet Decision Support Tool Application 
a. Traditional Maintenance Level Activities in Regards to Cost  
As described in scenario ONE, a determination of current costs to run the 
I-Level maintenance activity annually is necessary.  These costs can be retrieved from the 
baseline scenario data produced in Figure 1 (Large LCC).  From this model, each of the 
three levels of maintenance activity’s cost structure can be isolated to determine the 
annual costs for each based on manning, training, and repair costs.   Additionally, the 
level of reliability is provided based on the annual cost.  With this information, a PM can 
view the current level of reliability being provided and current cost simultaneously.  If a 
contractor proposes to perform any level of maintenance for a targeted cost structure and 
level of reliability, the PM will be capable to perform an educated comparison using this 
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spreadsheet decision tool support application between the contractor’s offer and what is 
currently being performed. 
b. The Affect on LCC by Outsourcing I Level Maintenance Activity 
for a Single Critical Component 
(1)  Baseline for LCC Spreadsheet Model:  Under Scenario 2-a, the 
PM must decide the value added for each option available.  Outsourcing organic I-Level 
maintenance for a single critical component (i.e., the Engine of the UAV) to the OEM 
will result in longer TAT due the increased distance the critical component must travel to 
and from the repair site.  Additionally, since the requirement to repair the Engine has 
been removed from the I-Level it has been determined that the manning level for junior 
maintenance personnel, E-1 to E-6, will be reduced from five to two and the training time 
will be reduced from 20 weeks to ten.  Isolating these variables the PM is able to measure 
the change in LCC if the I-Level maintenance activity is outsourced for the Engine.  
Figure 1 and all populated data are the baseline for this scenario.  Figures 1 through 1f 
reflect the baseline scenario of this particular UAV system.  This figure includes cost 
from RDT&E, Production, Operational Support, and Disposal requirements throughout 
the life span of 20 years for this system.  All data are assumptions for analytical analysis 
only. 
(2)  Calculating the Cost of I-Level Maintenance for a Single 
Critical Component to LCC:  For the PM to decide if the UAV engine should deviate 
from the traditional organic I-Level maintenance, it is critical that the current MTBF and 
cost structure be calculated.  Specifically, the PM needs to identify the cost of 
training/week (i.e., Basic and Advanced), labor costs (i.e., I-Level repair cost per repair), 
Officer and Enlisted salaries, and the impact on LCC.  From the annual I-Level costs 
column of Figure 1c (O&M Workbook Page) in Appendix B, the total cost for organic I-
Level maintenance could be determined.  In the same column the annual cost of 
performing organic I-Level repair on each individual item is also identified.  This amount 
is the baseline cost for performing traditional organic maintenance on the component.  
Once the baseline is determined then the changes to manning (i.e., reduction in training 
weeks for I-Level Basic Maintenance. Training and number of I-level personnel needed), 
and MTBF for the Engine could be made to Figure 1 (User Inputs Workbook Page).  
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Additionally, the TAT for the Engine will be adjusted using the TAT (days) I-Level 
outsource block L19 of Figure 1.   
To allow the model to change the TAT for a single component 
(i.e., the engine) the user must modify the equation in cell G22 of the O&M workbook 
page from =AVHours*SpareLevelFactor to =AVHours*SpareLevelFactorOut.  This 
change can be made to any of the corresponding cells (i.e., G23 will change the TAT for 
the propeller) to change the TAT for a single component.  When cell G22 is changed only 
the TAT for the engine will be changed all other I-Level TAT’s will reflect the number in 
cell H22, TAT (days) I-Level, of Figure 1.  The PM can now determine the cost ceiling 
for outsourcing I-level maintenance for a critical component.  Any dollar amount higher 
than this figure would not be cost effective, unless the contractor is able to provide a 
higher level of reliability. 
 c. The Affect on LCC by Outsourcing I-Level Maintenance Activity 
(1)  Baseline for LCC Spreadsheet Model:  Figure 1 and all 
assumed data that was used in Scenario One will be used for the base scenario in 
Scenario 2b. 
(2)  Calculating the Cost of I-Level Maintenance Activity to LCC:  
For the PM to decide if the system should deviate from the traditional organic I-Level 
maintenance, it is critical to calculate what the system’s current MTBF is for each 
individual component and the cost structure at the I-Level.  Specifically, the PM needs to 
identify the cost of training/week (i.e., Basic and Advanced), labor costs (i.e., I-Level 
repair cost per repair), Officer and Enlisted salaries, I-Level operating cost per year and 
the impact on LCC. 
Once the PM identifies the costs then they can be used to populate 
the model.  From the annual I-Level costs column of Figure 1c (O&M Workbook Page) 
in Appendix B, the total cost for organic I-Level maintenance could be determined.  This 
amount is the baseline cost for performing traditional organic maintenance on the 
component.  Additionally, the annual cost for manning and training, as seen in Figure 1a 
(Manning Workbook Page) and 1b (Training Workbook Page) in Appendix B, could be 
determined.  These costs along with annual I-Level operational costs are the baseline for 
the cost of organic I-Level maintenance.   
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Once the baseline is determined then the changes to manning (i.e., 
reduction of all I-Level Basic and Advanced Maintenance Training and all I-Level 
personnel), TAT, I-Level repair cost, and reduction in I-Level operating costs/yr can be 
made to Figure 1 (User Inputs Workbook Page).   The PM can now determine the cost 
ceiling for outsourcing I level maintenance for the same level of reliability.  Any dollar 
amount higher than this figure would not be cost effective, unless the contractor is able to 
provide a higher level of reliability. 
3. Scenario Two Model Analysis 
a. Scenario 2-a LCC Spreadsheet Model Analysis  
Scenario 2-a will analyze outsourcing the I-Level maintenance of a single 
component with the incentive to improve reliability through system redesign.  Primarily, 
Scenario 2-a focuses on this issue on a macro scale with multiple variables changing (i.e., 
MTBF, TAT, manning levels, and training time) each independently effecting LCC in a 
positive or negative way.  Additionally, the scenario addresses the highly controversial 
issue of removing all I-Level testing capabilities for the service.  Scenario 2-a does not 
remove the I-Level function entirely; it allows the service to continue to test the 
component to ensure the item is defective prior to being shipped to the OEM for I-Level 
repair.  This capability is thought by some to be a necessary check to ensure the 
component is not shipped to the OEM with no defects a term known in the Navy as A-
799. 
The LCC Spreadsheet Model is a flexible model that allows the PM to 
change multiple variables to see the effect on LCC.  In Scenario 2-a the baseline is the 
same as Scenario 1, Figure 1.   All LCC cost figures have been adjusted for inflation and 
NPV and all annual figures are in current year dollars.  From Figure 1 (Base Scenario) 
the LCC is determined to be $336,090,952 for a 20 year life span for this particular UAV 
system.  Figure 1a in Appendix B shows total manning salary cost to be $3,260,000 
annually beginning in FY 2005 and a total LCC cost to be $26,746,466.  This amount 
includes manning salaries at the O, I & D levels of maintenance.  However, this scenario 
is only concerned with the manning salaries of the enlisted personnel at the I-Level which 
is $350,000 annually. 
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Figure 1b in Appendix B shows training which will begin in FY2004, one 
year prior to the UAV system being fielded at an annual cost of $871,000. Since the 
initial training of personnel is completed prior to a system being fielded, the initial cost of 
$871,000 will be for FY2004 only.  Once initial training is completed there will only be a 
need to train replacement personnel for the maintainers that leave service or transfer to 
other systems.  Our model assumes that there will be a 20 percent attrition rate for all 
personnel. Beginning in FY 2005 the total training cost for O, I, &D Level personnel is 
shown to be $345,000 annually. However, this scenario is only concerned with the I-
Level basic training costs for the E-1 to E-6, junior enlisted, maintenance personnel 
which is $160,000 for FY2004 and $32,000 annually thereafter.  Additionally, the total 
training LCC is shown to be $3,526,507. 
Figure 1c in Appendix B shows the O&M costs for the entire UAV 
system.  The total O&M LCC cost is $56,004,907.  However, in this analysis the focus 
will be on the engine which the PM has considered to be the most critical component to 
outsource to the OEM.  With an estimated 1,500 flight hours per UAV per year and an 
engine MTBF of 1,187 hours the number of engine failures per year per UAV system is 
eight.  The PM has determined that the organic I-Level TAT is 20 days for the engine.  
Additionally, the PM requires that all critical components be stocked at a 95 percent 
confidence level.  Given this, the number of spares need to meet this requirement is two.  
The price for each Engine is $75,000.  Therefore, the initial cost for spares is $428,271, 
the annual I-Level maintenance cost per system for the engine is $11,373, and the annual 
spare part carrying cost is $179,874. 
To answer the first two questions of the scenario, three of the four 
variables (i.e., TAT to 30 days, reduction in E1 to E-6 manpower from five to two, and 
reducing the training time from 20 weeks to ten) must be changed in the Users Input page 
of the baseline model.  After the change, Figure 2.1 (Appendix B) displays the new LCC 
to be 334,134,474.  This is a significant change from the original LCC of $336,090,952.  
The savings equates to a LCC reduction of $1,956,478 over the 20 year life span of this 
particular UAV system.  Since the reduction in training and personnel costs were greater 
than the increase in spare part inventory costs the outsourcing of the I-Level can be 
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justified by the PM.  Additionally, the PM now knows the savings over the life-cycle of 
the UAV system and is able to use this amount as the baseline for the contractual 
agreement with the OEM.  The PM should not pay more than $1,956,478 over the 20 
year life span of this particular UAV system unless the MTBF of the engine is improved 
and demonstrated. 
Further comparisons can be made in each of the Workbook pages to 
understand how the cost savings were calculated.  In the baseline scenario, the manning 
salary of the enlisted personnel at the I-Level was $350,000 annually.  Figure 2.1a in 
Appendix B shows that by reducing the I-Level enlisted manning the annual cost is 
$140,000 a savings of $210,000 per year.  The new LCC for manning is $25,023,535 
down from the baseline amount of $26,746,466.  This savings equates to a total LCC cost 
savings of $1,722,931. 
The reduction in personnel and training time for the enlisted maintainers at 
the basic I-Level is shown in Figure 2.1b in Appendix B.  The new basic training costs of 
the I-Level E-1 to E-6 maintenance personnel in FY 2004 went from $160,000 to $32,000 
and in the following years training cost was cut from $32,000 to $16,000 annually.  The 
total LCC for training went from $3,526,507 to $3,292,960.  This is a savings of 
$233,547 over the 20 year life of the UAV system. 
The outsourcing of the I-Level increased the TAT from 20 days to 30 
days.  Figure 2.1.c (Appendix B) displays the O&M Workbook page.  It can be seen that 
there is no change in the number of spares needed to meet the 95 percent fill rate.  
Therefore, there is no change in LCC as a result of a ten day increase in TAT. 
To answer question three of this scenario, the final variable (i.e., 
increasing MTBF of the engine to 1,500) needs to be inserted into the model. After the 
change, Figure 2.2 in Appendix B reveals that the LCC went from $334,134,474 to 
$334,099,353.  This is a cost saving of $35,121 over the 20 year life of the UAV system.  
Therefore, it can be determined that the value of increasing the MTBF of the Engine by 
313 hours is worth $35,121 and that the OEM should not be given an incentive any larger 
than this amount to increase the MTBF to 1,500 hours. 
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A closer analysis of the changes reveals that O&M costs were affected in 
the following ways.  Figure 2.2.c in Appendix B shows that when the MTBF was 
increased to 1,500 hours the number of failures per year was cut in half from eight to 
four.  This reduced the annual cost for O, I, &D Level maintenance from $298,253 to 
$294,772 a savings of $3,481 annually.  The remaining annual savings can be seen in the 
reduction of transportation costs.  Transportation cost goes from $30,600 to $29,800.  
This equates to a combined savings of $4,281 annually.       
b. Scenario 2-a Conclusion 
Using the LCC model to study a highly complex issue of changing 
multiple variables in the logistics and maintenance cycle of one critical component 
reveals a multitude of useful information for the PM.  The PM is able to understand the 
interrelationships between how the outsourcing of a maintenance level will affect TAT, 
manning, training and O&M costs over the entire life-cycle of a system.  Additionally, 
the PM can determine what the proposed outsourcing is worth in cost savings and what 
the incentive is worth if the improvement in MTBF is demonstrated by the OEM.  This 
useful tool will arm the PM with critical information that he or she could use to make the 
right choice at the right price. 
c. Scenario 2-b LCC Spreadsheet Model Analysis 
Scenario 2-b addresses a complex issue of determining the value of a 
proposed outsourcing of an entire maintenance echelon.  This scenario is unique in the 
fact that the OEM maintenance personnel will occupy the existing I-Level maintenance 
facility.  The OEM has determined that they would be able to reduce manning from seven 
to six and reduce the working hours at the facility by 50 percent.  These reductions are 
estimated, by the OEM, to lower I-Level operating cost by 20 percent annually.  
However, the cost per repair will double and the annual salary amount will increase 
because of the increase in skilled labor (i.e., OEM maintenance person will equal that of 
an officer, $120,000 per year).  The PM must be able to determine the baseline amount 
that he or she would be willing to pay for the outsourcing and determine the value of the 
reduction in I-Level facility operating costs over the life-cycle of the program.  This 
value will be the maximum that the incentive will be worth if demonstrated by the OEM. 
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The baseline model will use the same baseline as scenario 2-a.  Figure 1 
shows the LCC for the UAV system, using all three levels of organic maintenance, to be 
$336,090,952.  All manning, training and O&M workbook pages are identical to scenario 
2a. 
The following variables have been changed in the user input page of the 
baseline model to simulate scenario 2-b. 
• Reduced manning from seven to six and moved all six into the Officer 
Manning block to simulate the $120,000 a year salary.  
•  Set all training weeks for I-Level to zero.     
• Reduced I-Level TAT from 20 days to ten days. 
• Increased cost per repair at the I-Level from $3,000 to $6,000. 
Figure 2.3 in Appendix B reveals that after the changes were made that the LCC for the 
UAV would increase from $336,090,952 to $336,972,573.  This increase of $881,621 
clearly shows that the reduction in TAT, facility operating cost, organic manning and 
training would not be greater than the increase in repair costs and manning salary.  This 
justifies that the proposal should not be accepted unless the OEM was willing to reduce 
the cost per repair or reduce the manning costs. 
If however, the PM would have entered all the variables at the same time 
including the estimated 20 percent reduction in I-Level facility operating cost the picture 
would have been much different.  Figure 2.4 in Appendix B shows scenario 2-b with all 
the proposed changes.  The LCC indicates that the potential savings could go from 
$336,090,952 to $327,127,254 a savings of $8,963,698.  Clearly, the picture would have 
given the impression that entering into this venture had the enormous possibility to save 
the PM a great deal of money over the life-cycle of the program.  However, what the PM 
would not have seen is what the program would cost if the savings, which were promised 
by the OEM, were never realized. 
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d. Scenario 2-b Conclusion 
Using this LCC model to evaluate a complex scenario of changing from an 
organic maintenance structure to an outsourced one with multiple changing variables can 
provide the PM with valuable information on what each change is worth.  Understanding 
how each variable changes LCC and seeing the weight each incremental change is worth 
is priceless to a PM when they are faced with complicated decisions like this one.  Once 
the PM realized that the original proposal would cost the program more money, if the 
estimated savings were not realized, then he or she could adjust either, the number of 
maintenance personnel, the annual amount of manning salary, or the cost for each I-Level 
repair until the breakeven point was indicated.  Once the breakeven point was known, 
then the PM could counter offer with a different proposal and offer the estimated 
percentage of facility operating cost reduction as an incentive which would be paid if the 
OEM could actually demonstrate these savings. 
The Large LCC model is comprised of six worksheets that represent the 
major cost drivers of the total ownership cost of the weapon system.  The model shows in 
intricate detail how each worksheet is linked and contributes to the total Life Cycle Cost 
by changing the input parameters in the worksheets.  The static nature of this model is 
unable to analyze the relationship between reliability and Operational Availability.  For 
example, any decline in reliability will result in an increased occurrence of failures.  This 
will multiply the workload at the repair facility.  As a consequence, a greater workload at 
the repair facility runs the risk of congestion and a bottleneck in repair operations may 
occur.  This will negatively affect MDT and TAT will increase as a result.  In an attempt 
to compensate for this limitation, the Small LCC model and a simulation based model are 
used to reflect this dynamic relationship.  To depict this relationship, the Small LCC 
analyzes the impact of component reliability changes on the Total Life Cycle cost while 
the simulation based model estimates Operational Availability.  The Small LCC model 
will provide resource managers with information about the costs associated with 
improvements in reliability, while the simulation model will provide information to the 
warfighter about the contribution of increased reliability to Operational Availability.  
Both models will be used in scenario Three analysis. 
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 Scenario Three will evaluate the impact that potential incentives may 
have if incorporated into a weapon system contract.  The scenario will use the Small LCC 
model and simulation model to evaluate the financial impact on Life Cycle Cost and 
contribution to Operational Availability of an incentivized contract to redesign a 
subcomponent of a weapon system.  This scenario will also use the Small LCC model to 
analyze the effects TAT has on the logistical footprint required to support a weapon 
system.  
C. SCENARIO THREE 
Scenario 3:  A Program Manager (PM) is seeking to incentivize a contract that 
will encourage contractors to improve reliability and reduce total ownership costs for 
specified subcomponents of a weapon system.  Within this contract, the PM is 
considering the option to outsource the I-Level maintenance activity for a particular 
subsystem.  Potential contractors have expressed interest in redesigning the 
subcomponent to achieve a greater MTBF, and reduce the turn around time (TAT).  The 
spare parts inventory will be managed by the service.  If the PM decides to outsource 
maintenance, labor costs will increase.  After examining the current cost schedule of the 
I-Level maintenance activity, the PM must determine if outsourcing is the best course of 
action for the program.  Quantifying the value of a monetary incentive for a gain in 
reliability is needed to assist the PM in making the right financial investment decision.  A 
system consists of four UAVs and maintains an operational capacity of 125 hours per 
weapon system a month 
Scenario 3-a. Currently, the portable GCS has an MTBF of 200 hours, with a unit 
cost of $100,000.  Assume that the I-Level repair time for the portable GCS is 20 days 
and labor costs are $100/hr.  The outsourcing of this maintenance activity for the subunit 
will increase the labor costs to $500/hr.  What information will be needed and how would 
the PM justify an incentive to improve the MTBF to 500 hours? 
Scenario 3-b. The contractor does not redesign the portable GCS, i.e. the MTBF 
has no change, but proposes to decrease the TAT.  What value would this decrease in 
TAT have for the program? 
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1. Decision Support Tool Description 
Attempting to isolate one subcomponent of a weapon system unveils how several 
other cost variables are interconnected and contribute to the total ownership costs.  The 
LCC is a complex equation and altering any one variable will change the entire equation.  
A PM seeking to determine the most cost effective investment for a program requires an 
analysis that ensures the contribution to the LCC is identified, while being able to 
ascertain the effects of changing one variable.  A financial spreadsheet model that is 
capable of providing this information can be utilized as a decision support tool for the 
PM to make sound investment decisions, as depicted in Figure 3 in Appendix B.  This 
model will compute spare parts requirements, transportation, inventory, and repair costs 
over the life cycle of the weapon system.  A key limitation to the Small LCC model is the 
static nature that is unable to compute operational availability and capture the dynamic 
relationship between the mean time between maintenance (MTBM) and maintenance 
downtime (MDT).  This model focuses only on reliability and maintainability of the 
weapon system.  Yet the spreadsheet model is valuable to the PM for cost computation.  
However, the limitations of the spreadsheet model can be alleviated by the use of 
a simulation model, as depicted in Figure 3.1 in Appendix B.  This model can evaluate 
and graphically depict the contribution to the operational availability of any investment in 
the improvement of reliability for a weapon system.  To illustrate this, a simulation model 
mimics the dynamic relationship of MTBM and MDT within the Operational Availability 
equation: Ao = MTBM / (MTBM + MDT) Having these two decision support tools will 
better equip the PM to manage a program that is cost effective and reliable for the war 
fighter.    
2. Spreadsheet Decision Support Tool Application 
a. PM and Contracts 
The PM seeking to reduce total ownership costs and increase the 
reliability of a particular subunit of a weapon system must take a creative and realistic 
approach in contract details as costs usually increase with an increase in reliability.  
Another challenge for the PM is a DoD experiencing budget atrophy.  The PM has a 
difficult mission to get the most bang for each tax payer dollar and is further burdened 
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with the need to accurately value the contributions of a potential contractor in 
accomplishing this mission.  Incentivizing a contract will allow the PM to specify the 
requirements in the contract and the return to the contractor for achieving the desired 
results.  The benefit of incentivizing a contract will also encourage potential contractors 
to be innovative and find cost saving methods in their attempts at creating a winning bid.  
The contractor and the government will enjoy a positive return on investment as a result 
of implementing incentives in a contract.  The financial decision support tool will allow 
for the PM to measure the worth of each incentive that may be placed in the contract.  
The PM will also be able to quantify the proposals within a contract to determine the 
value added to the program. 
b. The Effect on LCC by Outsourcing Organic I-Level Maintenance 
(1)  Baseline for LCC Spreadsheet Model:  Scenario Three, Figure 
3 in Appendix B, the PM must decide the value added for each option available.  
Outsourcing organic maintenance to a contractor normally comes with an increase in 
labor costs.  The Intermediate Level maintenance requires more skilled labor, which will 
further increase labor costs.  Isolating this one variable, labor costs, the PM is able to 
measure the change in LCC if the I-Level maintenance activity is outsourced for a 
particular subunit.  Performing this calculation will provide the PM a baseline metric to 
determine the value addition for a proposed increase in either reliability or turn-around-
time (TAT) by the contractor.  Assume the annual cost of capital for the PM’s 
calculations is at 10%.  The current organic maintenance cost for the portable GCS is 
$115,200, and the total repair cost for the system is $1,704,960.  The current cost per 
weapon system per year is calculated to be $3,398,184.  This annual cost adjusted for the 
twenty year life cycle comes to $22,861,283. 
(2)  Calculating Contract Labor Cost to LCC:  Data collected by 
the PM determines the aggregate average organic I-Level maintenance labor rate to be 
$100/hr.  The outsourcing of this maintenance activity will increase labor costs to 
$500/hr.  Using the decision support tool, the PM is able to quantify the immediate 
financial impact the increased labor costs will have on the total repair costs for the 
portable GCS, the total cost per system per year, and the LCC for the system. The 
increase in labor costs raises the total repair cost of the portable GCS to $576,000, an 
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increase of $460,800.  This increase raises the total annual cost per system per year to 
$3,858,984.  Outsourcing the maintenance activity will result in an addition of 
$3,100,032 to the LCC, bringing the new total LCC to $25,961,315. 
Recall the base scenario’s LCC was $22,861,283.  The $3,100,032 
total increase in LCC costs from outsourcing maintenance alone must be justifiable in 
terms of value added to the program.  Committing capital resources to outsource 
maintenance will require an accurate measure of value added to the program.  Inherent to 
each weapon system is the demand for reliability.  Essential to reliability is the MTBF of 
a weapon system and its subcomponents.  Assuming the TAT remains at 20 days, the PM 
is aware that outsourcing the maintenance activity alone raises the repair cost for the 
portable GCS by $460,800 and a total increase of $3,100,032 to LCC.  This overall 
increase in LCC is an area to be targeted for incorporating incentives into the contract 
that will bring value to the program in terms of improved reliability. 
c. Contractor Incentive to Improve MTBF Through Redesign 
Seeking to improve the reliability of the portable GCS, the PM has the 
ability to quantify the worth of any incentive that may be incorporated into the contract 
that will increase the reliability.  Assuming the current MTBF to be 200 hours, the PM 
discovers that at 215 hours, the number of spare parts reduces by one, requiring eight 
spares to be in inventory.  Assume the annualized spare cost is at 21% is $168,000, 
equivalent to a reduction to 18 days of TAT.  What differs is the number of failures per 
system per year.  The portable GCS is a subunit of the ground control station (GCS).  The 
GCS has a monthly operational requirement of 240 hours.  To calculate the number of 
failures, the formula GCS monthly hours * (12 months/MTBF) is used.  The 200 hours 
MTBF for the portable GCS results in an average of 14.4 failures per UAV per year, and 
115.2 failures per weapon system.  Increasing the MTBF to 215 hours, 13.4 failures will 
occur per system per year, and 107.2 failures per weapon system per year.  If a contract 
were to increase the MTBF to this amount, the value of those fifteen additional MTBF 
hours result in one less spare part required to be managed in inventory, one less failure, 
and $40,186 in savings for total repair costs.  The savings to total cost per system per 
year is $62,793 and $422,444 in LCC savings.  This is one simple example of measuring 
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the value added for an incentive that may be introduced in a contract.  The PM now has 
quantifiable justification for rewarding a contractor.  The contractor’s incentive to 
increase their profits by finding innovating means to improve reliability in the redesign of 
a subunit and cost cutting manufacturing measures to further increase the MTBF will 
contribute to overall operational availability of the weapon system. 
3. Simulation Decision Support Tool Application 
a. PM and Warfighter 
 In determining the point of diminishing returns for investing in the 
improvement of reliability, a simulation model can be used to reflect the contribution of 
an incremental increase in a subunit’s MTBF to the system’s operational availability.  
This additional decision support tool can be utilized by the PM to present to the 
warfighter the value added for them in operational availability, while using the 
spreadsheet model to reflect the financial justification to those approving budget requests.  
Using the simulation model, the PM can evaluate different scenarios in which one area of 
the weapon system is isolated to determine the value of improved reliability and a point 
of diminishing returns. 
b. The Effect on Operational Availability by Outsourcing Organic 
I-Level Maintenance 
(1)  Baseline for Simulation Model:  Assuming the PM has 
collected data that represents the MTBF of the three major subsections of the UAV 
system: the GCS, Ground Equipment, and the Air Vehicle.  For purposes of 
demonstrating the ability to isolate one section and determine a point of diminishing 
returns in the investment of improved reliability, a listing of ten program runs are used 
for the testing.  All three sections of the weapon system will have a base MTBF of 500 
hours.  The simulation model will be programmed to reflect a weapon system operating 
for 12 hours daily and a total of 1,000 hours for testing purposes. 
(2)  Calculating Operational Availability:  If the PM incrementally 
increases the MTBF of the GCS by 50 hours for each of the ten program runs, depicted in 
Figure 3.1.1 in Appendix B, the simulation model will assist in determining the most 
effective MTBF rate to improve the operational availability and the point of diminishing 
returns.   Running the simulation model, program run seven with an MTBF of 800 hours 
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for the GCS produces an average operational availability of 66%.  This marks the highest 
improvement in operational availability, and the point of diminishing returns.  Any 
further investment in reliability of this major section alone will not be productive to the 
warfighter.  The investment required to improve the reliability by 300 hours can thereby 
be weighed with the effect on LCC with the spreadsheet model.   This data, used with the 
spreadsheet model, will provide the PM the value added to the warfighter with an 
accurate cost computation.  
4. Scenario Three Model Analysis 
a. Scenario 3-a LCC Spreadsheet and Simulation Model Analysis 
The most cost effective improvement in reliability must be calculated if 
the maintenance is outsourced.  It is assumed that outsourcing the maintenance will also 
result in the subunits redesign to improve the MTBF.  It is also assumed that each failure 
requires $200 in transportation cost to and from the repair site.  The incremental increase 
in MTBF for the portable GCS results in the decrease in the number of spare parts 
required to be maintained in inventory, a decrease in the number of failures per UAV and 
system per year, the total number of repair hours for the year, and the transportation cost.  
This cost calculation will demonstrate the value added with each incremental increase in 
reliability.  Increasing the MTBF to 500 hours, the LCC for the system becomes 
$22,836,902.  This is a decrease of $3,124,413 from the $25,961,315 LCC for 
outsourcing the maintenance only to the contractor.  This cost savings can potentially be 
the value of the improvement in reliability which can be used by the PM to assess the 
monetary incentive reward to the contractor.  Any additional improvement in MTBF will 
be an opportunity for the contractor to receive a greater profit.  
The PM is now better informed to measure the value added from the 
contractor and to make a determination of what to incentivize in the contract.  Key to the 
program is the issue of reliability and the PM must weigh any improvement with the 
associated costs.  If the PM wants to ascertain a target decrease in the TAT if the 
maintenance activity was outsourced, this is another variable that can further be isolated 
for study.  Also, a measure of the impact on reliability and cost to the program resulting 
from a decrease in TAT will be assist the PM in making investment decisions.  The 
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baseline has a total annualized spares cost of $1,449,000 a year at a 21% annual 
inventory rate.  Decreasing the TAT specifically for the portable GCS, the PM is able to 
quantify a point of diminishing returns.  This decision support tool provides to the PM the 
ability to incrementally change this variable and see how each change will influence the 
total ownership cost equation. 
b. Scenario 3-a Conclusion 
Figure 3 in Appendix B demonstrates the complexity of the LCC equation 
for maintenance costs.  The information need by the PM to make investment decisions 
that will affect the life of a program must be accurate and realistic.  As shown in this 
scenario, when isolating the costs to outsource labor, this individual variable significantly 
affects the total maintenance costs, and LCC.  The PM must be knowledgeable about the 
LCC equation and how each individual contributes to this cost.  Understanding the return 
for each incremental improvement in reliability for the portable GCS, the PM will be able 
to justify the costs associated with each percentage increase in reliability and determine a 
point of diminishing returns.  Examining an increase in reliability for the portable GCS to 
500hrs MTBF, total maintenance costs are reduced by $69,120, and total spares required 
is reduced from nine to four.  Using the spreadsheet model in Figure 3 in Appendix B, the 
PM is able to determine that an MTBF of 460hrs, the spare parts level is reduced to four.  
Knowing this information, the PM is able to make an accurate assessment of the size of 
the logistical footprint that will be required to support.  An important feature of this 
decision support tool, the PM will be able to determine the size of the logistical footprint, 
with associated costs, to support a weapon system.  
c. Scenario 3-b Spreadsheet Model Analysis 
The value added for decreasing the TAT alone must be measured in order 
to determine the worth of outsourcing the maintenance activity.  Assuming the current 
TAT is 20 days, the annualized spare cost for the portable GCS is at $189,000.  The 
portable GCS is classified as a non-critical subunit and the spare parts protection level of 
85% is required to be maintained.  Each UAV weapon system contains two portable GCS 
units, at a cost of $100,000 each. The baseline of a 20 day TAT requires nine spare parts 
to be maintained in inventory.  These nine units, costing $100,000 each, make up the 
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$189,000 annualized spare costs.  In order to determine the number of required spare 
parts, λ (1/MTBF), K (number of components), and T (time) must be identified.  Time 
(T) is calculated using the ground equipment’s monthly operating hours multiplied by the 
quotient of TAT in a 30 day period (20/30). 
The equation K*λ*T = average number of failures during the repair 
turnaround: 8*(1/200)*160 = 6.4 failures during a 20 day TAT.  This is used with the 
Poisson distribution table to determine the number of spare parts required to maintain a 
protection level of 85%.  Decreasing the TAT by one day, to 19 days, K* λ*T = 6.08.  
This will still require nine spare parts to be maintained.  A decrease in the number of 
spare parts does not take place until the TAT is reduced to 18 days.  This will reduce the 
spare parts required to eight and decrease the total spare cost for the portable GCS to 
$800,000 and an annualized cost of $168,000.  The total annualized spare cost will be 
reduced to $1,428,000.  This reduction of $21,000 in total annualized spare costs 
decreases the total costs per system per year to $3,837,984 with a further savings of 
$141,278 to the LCC.  
d. Scenario 3-b Conclusion 
The new LCC for the weapon system is now $25,820,037 as a result of 
outsourcing the maintenance activity and decreasing the TAT to 18 days.  This 
incremental decrease in LCC resulting from a decrease in TAT will allow for the PM to 
justify a targeted TAT with the associated costs to incentivize a contract.  One example of 
doing just that would be for the PM to offer the $141,278 in program savings to the 
contractor for reward of reducing and maintaining a TAT of 18 days or less.  If the 
contractor manages to further reduce the TAT, the additional costs savings to the LCC of 
the program can be rewarded to the contractor as additional profit. If the contractor does 
not meet this requirement, they will forego this cash incentive.  Recognizing the minimal 
value added of decreasing TAT alone when maintenance is outsourced, the PM now has a 
quantified monetary reason to seek the improvement in MTBF in addition to a reduction 
in TAT for the portable GCS. 
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V. CONCLUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A.  MOTIVATION 
To assist Program Managers and others in defense acquisitions, a decision support 
tool that analyzes the financial options available when making an investment decision 
would greatly improve the content of a contract.  As stated in the introduction, there is no 
standard decision support tool or methodology that will do this for defense contracts.  
With the DoD in transition to a leaner, versatile organization, and an ever decreasing 
budget, the need to adopt business practices that capitalizes on the ROI of every tax 
dollar spent on programs to improve reliability is present.  The importance and benefits 
of applying such a decision support tool in creating contracts exceed the short term 
financial impact associated with any program.  The ROI in improvement in reliability as 
a result of applying the concepts associated with the models will reduce not only the total 
ownership costs, but will provide the warfighter a reliable weapon system with a 
minimum logistics footprint.   
The models proposed in this project are intended to be a template for PMs to use 
and tailor to their specific program.  The two spreadsheet models evaluate the cost impact 
on the LCC when a variable in the total Life Cycle Cost equation is isolated and adjusted 
to reflect the criteria within a contact.  Our Large LCC spreadsheet encompasses a broad 
financial outlook that accounts for Manning, Training, O&M, and RDT&E, and 
maintenance costs.  This model is intended to support the PM when attempting to 
quantify the various hidden cost that each contract may have.  To account strictly for 
maintenance cost information, the Small LCC spreadsheet model is used to conduct the 
analysis.  This model is used to isolate individual subcomponent costs to weigh the 
tradeoffs associated with outsourcing to a potential contractor.  The simulation language, 
Arena, supports our simulation based model that depicts the impact on Operational 
Availability when a group of isolated variables receive an incremental increase in 
reliability.   Under ten program runs, each with an incremental increase in reliability, the 
PM will be able to identify the point of diminishing returns in reliability.  This 
information, coupled with the financial data of the spreadsheet models, will equip the PM 
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with the knowledge needed to create a robust contract that benefits the government, and 
the contractor.   
To illustrate the use and benefits of the proposed models, our project evaluates 
three different hypothetical scenarios that represent dilemmas PMs may encounter when 
having to make investment decisions.  By depicting the effects on LCC and operational 
readiness when cost and readiness parameters are changed, such as subcomponent 
MTBFs and TAT, the models are intended to be a decision support tool for PMs.  We 
first analyze the reasons for creating a standard model and method to assist PMs in 
meeting the needs of the warfighters, minimizing costs, and the logistics footprint of a 
program.  Next we summarize our findings from the analysis conducted using the 
proposed models.  Finally we conclude with a recommendation for further research and 
development for a tool that will further assist the PM with identifying a method to 
improve reliability that will also establish a confidence level that contractors will be able 
to achieve and maintain the terms of the contract.   
 
B. OVERVIEW 
The Department of Defense does not have a standardized model that will allow 
PMs to assess the value of potential incentive options being considered for incorporation 
into a contract.  The many financial legacy systems that are currently in use do not 
provide the services with a standardized application of measuring the worth of an 
incentivized contract.  A decision support tool that can accurately measure the value 
added of these incentives will assist PMs to determine the most cost effective 
improvement in reliability for a program.    The models we propose in this project 
demonstrate the applications of isolating one or many cost parameters, e.g., labor rate, 
MTBF, or manning levels, to determine the worth of an incentive for a program.  This 
value is measured by the contribution to reliability and LCC for the program.   
To demonstrate the potential of our models, our spreadsheets use data from the 
Army’s Shadow UAV.  This information provided the baseline of LCC and reliability to 
conduct our analysis.  Three hypothetical scenarios were created to reflect the financial 
costs and effect on reliability when the baseline was changed under an incentivized 
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contract.  We quantified the value additive of these incentives when subcomponent 
reliabilities or logistics support elements were changed.  The value added was measured 
in terms of contribution to Operational Availability and LCC.  Costs associated with 
manpower, training, RDTE, and O&M were taken into consideration to have a broad 
perspective when accounting for LCC.  The intent of the models we proposed in this 
project was to have an in-depth perspective concerning costs associated with the size of 
the logistics footprint required to support a weapon system.   
The first scenario depicted a situation in which the Intermediate Level 
maintenance activity was eliminated.  The maintenance was divided among the 
Organizational and Depot level activities for the UAV program.  The effects on LCC 
were computed as the percentage of maintenance responsibility was divided among the 
Organizational and Depot maintenance activities.  The size of the logistics footprint 
required to support this weapon system was analyzed as the maintenance and manning 
was arranged to reflect the responsibility assumed under the proposed contract.  Under 
this proposed contract scenario, the management of spare parts inventory would either be 
retained organically by the service or outsourced to the contractor.   
The second scenario took a critical look at an incentivized contract that 
outsourced the Intermediate Level maintenance for individual subcomponents of a 
weapon system.  The incentive for the contractor to improve reliability and receive a 
healthy profit in return was evaluated.  The spreadsheet model provided maintenance 
costs data that would reflect this outsourcing for the PM seeking to improve the reliability 
of the subcomponent.  The TAT was also analyzed for its contribution to reliability.  A 
simulation based model was used to reflect the incremental increases in reliability to 
determine the point of diminishing returns.  This model, used with the spreadsheet model, 
would provide the PM with cost data and effect on the Operational Availability of the 
weapon system.   
The third and final scenario took a more in-depth analysis of outsourcing the 
Intermediate Level maintenance activity.  The maintenance of a critical subcomponent or 
the entire weapon system was evaluated for outsourcing to the OEM.  Manpower and 
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training costs were appraised when maintenance was outsourced and the costs of 




 1. Changing the maintenance structure from three to two maintenance  
  activities can introduce cost savings without adversely effecting  
  system reliability.  
 
The Large LCC model can assist the Program Manager to create a maintenance 
strategy that will provide cost savings for a program while maintaining the same level of 
subcomponent reliability.   
 
 2. Cost savings from outsourcing spare parts management and   
  transportation requirements can be isolated to determine the potential 
  value for contract incentives. 
  
The Program Manager can use the Large LCC model to isolate major cost drivers 
of a weapon system.  This information can further assist the Program Manager to make 
investment decisions that reduce operating costs without adversely effecting the 
contribution to the warfighter. 
 
 3. Cost savings from outsourcing a single critical component or the  
  entire weapon system can be isolated to determine the potential value  
  of the incentive if the improvement is demonstrated by the OEM. 
  
The complex issue of changing multiple variables in the logistics and 
maintenance cycle (i.e., TAT, manning, training, and O&M costs) of one critical 
component or the entire weapon system reveals interdependent relationships between 
each one.  By understanding this relationship, the PM is able to weigh the effect of each 






4. The improvement of subcomponent reliability can be quantified and  
  evaluated for possible incorporation into a contract incentive. 
  
The Small LCC and simulation based models we proposed in this project will 
develop a cost forecast of potential contract incentives to support the Program Manager’s 
budget and estimate Operational Availability.  
 
 5. Isolating and decreasing the turn-around-time reduces the amount of  
  financial resources required to procure spare parts and decreases the  
  logistics footprint needed to support a weapon system. 
 
The Small LCC model can be tailored to analyze how changing reliability 
parameters effect the Life Cycle Costs.  The TAT was shown in Scenario 3-b how it can 





 1. The Department of Defense should adopt a standardized Total Life  
  Cycle Cost model that will be interoperable for all branches of   
  government to provide a uniformed cost analysis approach of contract 
  incentives.   
 
The models proposed in this project present the first-step toward a good template 
for standardization.  Our models attempt to isolate specific variables of the LCC equation 
to evaluate the benefits and costs being outsourced.   
 
 2. Reliability should be included in the Key Performance Parameters to  
  ensure funding is available to support the design and development of  
  items of the Program to operate under specified conditions.   
 
Reliability is not another logistics term.  Reliability is logistics.  Investment in 
strong reliability parameters in the development stages of a weapon system will not only 
greatly reduce the Life Cycle Costs, but will also provide the warfigher with a valuable 
asset.   
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 3. Research should be conducted to establish a methodology that will  
  provide the Program Manager a confidence level to ensure that  
  contractors are capable of maintaining the terms of the contract.  
 
The models proposed in this project can be a valuable tool for a PM or other 
applicable agencies concerned with a cost analysis of the complex nature attempting to 
integrate incentives into government contracts.  The models, coupled with the 
recommended methodology that establishes a confidence level of contractor support, will 
provide a robust decision support tool for the Program Manager. 
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APPENDIX A. UAV SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
 
1.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
 
The Shadow system consists of several components to include: the Ground Control 
Station (GCS) and its related equipment, the Aerial Vehicle (AV), Modular Mission 
Payload (MMP), and communications.   The Shadow is the Ground Maneuver Brigade 
Commander’s primary day/night, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition 
(RSTA) system.  The Shadow will provide the commander with a number of benefits to 
include enhanced enemy situational awareness, a target acquisition capability, battle 
damage assessment (BDA), and enhanced battle management capabilities (friendly 
situation and battlefield visualization).  The combination of these benefits contribute to 
the Commanders ability to dominate situational awareness allowing him to maneuver to 
points of positional advantage with speed and precision in order to conduct decisive 
operations.  
 
1.2.1 SYSTEM EQUIPMENT 
 
The Shadow baseline system will consist of two Ground Control Stations (GCS), two 
Ground Data Terminals (GDTs), one Portable Ground Control Station (PGCS), one 
Portable Ground Data Terminal (PGDT) with Line of Sight (LOS) command and control 
links to the AV, four Remote Video Terminals (RVTs), four Modular Mission Payloads 
(MMPs), and four Air Vehicles (one is a spare) to support a wartime surge OPTEMPO, 
and Launch and Recovery (L/R) capability).   
 
1.2.1.1 GROUND CONTROL STATION (GCS) 
 
The GCS is the command and control center for the UAV Shadow System.  It is utilized 
for pre-flight, launch, hand-off and recovery for operation of UAVs and payloads.  The 
Shadow GCS consists of a HMMWV equipped with an improved S-788 Type II shelter 
with towing capability, generator, and Environment Control Unit (ECU).  The Shadow 
GCS has two identical workstations capable of controlling the air vehicle and the 
payload, embedded training capabilities, and the necessary radios and equipment for both 




Figure 1.  GCS External View 
 






Figure 3.  GDT 
 
1.2.1.2 GROUND DATA TERMINALS (GDT) 
 
The GDT enables the data link to be sent between the GCS and the AV.  It is composed 
of transceivers and controls a Differential GPS Base Station (with position self-
determination), fiber optic link for remote operations of up to 400 meters, and directional 
antenna system for the primary command/telemetry and video links. The antenna system 
is designed for lightness, mobility, and air shipment.  It consists of a 4-foot antenna dish, 
positioner/RF box, tripod, and control unit (see Figure 3).  The GDT is generator 
powered. 
 
1.2.1.3 PORTABLE GROUND CONTROL STATION (PGCS) 
 
The PGCS is a portable ground control station that can perform preflight/take-
off/launch/recovery operations.  It mirrors the monitoring, control or mission planning 
function of the full GCS.  It uses one monitor, lacks the video recording system, and has 
less range in the primary and video links due to the use of omni antennas as its primary 
data link.  The PGCS can operate as a standalone system complete with appropriate 
powers source (primary and backup) or as a complimentary system coupled to the 
primary GCS with an umbilical.  It consists of two cases (See Figure 4).  Case 1 contains 
the processor, slot cards, and display.  Case 2 contains components to perform external 




Figure 4.  Portable Ground Control Station 
 
1.2.1.4 PORTABLE GROUND DATA TERMINAL (PGDT) 
 
The PGDT provides the data link for the PGCS.  The major components are common to 
the GDT (transceivers/receivers, etc.).  The PGDT will have a range of at least 30 Km. 
The PGDT is generator powered. 
 
1.2.1.5 MODULAR MISSION PAYLOADS (MMP) 
 
The payload identified for initial use with the Shadow System is the Plug-in Optical 
Payload (POP) 200 (Figure 5).  It is a day and night observation payload with tracker for 
UAV applications.  The payload contains two imaging sensors, FLIR and TV.  The FLIR 
provides the operator with medium wave infrared (MWIR) vision for target acquisition 
and tracking capability during day or night use.  The color TV has the same role for 
daytime operation.  The payload is contained in a single lightweight compact unit, which 
includes all the electronics necessary to operate the sensors, gimbals, and interfaces with 
the UAV avionics.  The POP 200 is comprised of two sub-units, a gimbaled turret, which 
is mounted on the UAV, and a plug-in sensors module.  The sensors module slides into 
the turret and functions both as the sensor and as the pitch gimbal, with no need for any 
additional wiring, cables, or connectors.  This approach allows the POP’s sensor module 
to be changed or replaced in the field by one person.  This operation takes only a few 


































Figure 6. Air Vehicle 
 
 
1.2.1.6 AIR VEHICLE (AV) 
 
The AV is the airborne platform of the UAV Shadow System (see Figures 6).  The AV is 
a high wing aircraft and serves as the “carrying device” for mission payloads.  The GCS 
through the GDT remotely controls this system.  AV will have on-station time of 4 hours 
at a 50Km range (objective is 3-4 hours at 200Km) with airborne mission equipment 
(MMP, transponder, etc.) included.  The AV will have autonomous navigation capability 
and flight between multiple selected waypoints.  Waypoints can be updated or 
reprogrammed from the controlling GCS. 
 




AV Launcher (see Figure 7) is a hydraulic launcher with an arrested shuttle for short 
take-off.  It folds horizontally to fit into the compact transport configuration and is 





Figure 7.  Launcher 
 
1.2.1.7.2  TACTICAL AUTOMATIC LANDING SYSTEM (TALS)   
 
The TALS (see Figure 8) is an automatic beacon landing system that is 
independent of any GPS data and provides an automated landing touchdown and rollout 
for recovery.  The TALS allows for the recovery of the Air Vehicle without an external 
pilot.  For autolanding, the operator initiates a sequence of commands that result in the 
desired automatic UAV guidance and control via the TALS.  The pattern starts with the 
UAV returning to a hold point near the landing zone.  The UAV will initiate an automatic 
hold sequence until personnel at the landing zone are in-place and ready for the vehicle to 
land.  The operator then commands the AV into the Acquisition Window (AW).  Next the 
operator commands the TALS to acquire and confirms transition to the TRACK mode.  
The AV continues into the Recovery Initiation Window (approximately 1 to 3 km final) 
and the operator invokes Autoland from the GCS.  The TALS controls the AV down the 
glide slope to flare/touchdown/roll-out/stop.  TALS will automatically abort following 
detection of a failure or by operator command to abort.   The PGCS generator through the 
PGCS uninterruptible power supply (UPS) normally power the TALS.  During initial 
entry, the TALS is powered from a TALS outlet on the GCS I/O panel.  TALS has a 
battery pack for back-up. 






1.2.1.7.3  ARRESTING GEAR 
 
Arrested recovery (see Figure 9) makes use of a deployable arresting hook 
mounted on the underside of the AV and ground-based pendant cables attached to an 
arresting brake at each end.  After landing, the arresting hook captures one of the cables 


















Figure 9.  Arresting Gear 
1.2.1.7.4 PARACHUTE RECOVERY 
 
The Shadow AV is equipped with a parachute in the event emergency recovery is 
necessary.  The parachute is deployed by a signal from the GCS or PGCS or 
automatically deployed by predefined emergency situations.  When fully deployed, the 
recovery parachute recovers the air vehicle upside down to prevent damage to the MMP.  
 
1.2.1.7.5 REMOTE VIDEO TERMINAL (RVT) 
 
The RVT (see Figure 10) is a stand-alone deployable ground unit that can track 
the AV and provide on-board payload sensor real-time video to a flat panel display.  
 68
Telemetric data received from the UAV provides information for overlay on the display 
to enhance the operator’s situational awareness and to provide vital information related to 
targeting. 
The RVT consists of two major components: the a field deployable Antenna 
Assembly with Directional Antenna and a Remote Terminal Assembly.  The RVT is 
powered with AC power, if not available the HMMWV 24/28 VDC power can be used.  
The RVT has a battery pack which may be used as back-up power in case of AC loss.  
The RVT is a lightweight, portable, passive (receive only) unit operable from either a 
HMMWV or fixed base.  It passively tracks a selected AV and displays Payload imagery 
from that AV, along with Date/Time Group (DTG) and navigation information.  
Displayed target coordinates and RVT coordinates can be used to determine how far a 
threat is from the RVT.   
 
 
Figure 10:  RVT System
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APPENDIX B. LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1.a:  Baseline Scenario Manning Input Page 
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Figure 1.b:  Baseline Scenario Training Input Page 
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       Figure 1.c:  Baseline Scenario O&M Input Page 
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       Figure 1.d:  Baseline Scenario RDT&E Input Page 
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      Figure 1.e:  Baseline Scenario Totals Page 
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        Figure 1.1:  Scenario 1-a User Input Page 
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Figure 1.2:  Scenario 1-b O&M Page 
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       Figure 2.1:  Scenario 2-a User Input Page 
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       Figure 2.1.a:  Scenario 2-a Manning Page 
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       Figure 2.1.c:  Scenario 2-a O&M Page 
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      Figure 2.2:  Scenario 2-a User Input Page w/Engine MTBF Increase 
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Figure 2.2c:  Scenario 2-a O&M Page w/Engine MTBF Increase 
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             Figure 2.3:  Scenario 2-b User Input Page 
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Figure 2.4:  Scenario 2-b User Input Page w/20% Reduction in I Level Operating Cost 
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Figure 3:  Scenario 3 Baseline 
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Figure 3.1:  Scenario 3 Simulation Model 
 86
       Figure 3.1.1:  Scenario 3 Simulation Spreadsheet
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APPENDIX C. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
λ     lambda 
ACAT     Acquisition Category 
ACC     Aircraft Controlling Custodians 
AE     Age Exploration 
Ao     Operational Availability 
AV     Air Vehicle 
AVHours    Air Vehicle Hours 
AW     Acquisition Window 
BCA     Business Case Analysis 
BDA     Battle Damage Assessment 
COMNAVAIRFOR   Commander, Naval Air Force 
D Level Maintenance   Depot Level Maintenance 
DoD     Department of Defense 
DPG     Defense Planning Guide 
DTG     Date/Time Group 
E     Enlisted 
ECU     Environmental Control Unit 
FCA     Field Cognizant Activities 
FIRST     F/A-18E/F Integrated Readiness Support Team 
FLIR     Forward Looking Infrared 
FY     Fiscal Year 
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GAO     General Accountability Office 
GCS     Ground Control Station 
GDT     Ground Data Terminal 
GPS     Global Positioning System 
HMMWV    High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
Hrs     Hours 
IG     Inspector General 
I Level Maintenance   Intermediate Level Maintenance 
IMA     Intermediate Maintenance Activity 
K     Number of Components 
KPP     Key Performance Parameters 
LCC     Life Cycle Cost 
LOS     Line of Sight 
L/R     Launch/Recovery 
MDT      Maintenance Down Time 
MMP     Modular Mission Payload 
MTBF     Mean Time Between Failure 
MTBM    Mean Time Between Maintenance 
MWIR     Medium Wave Infrared 
NAMP     Naval Aviation Maintenance Program 
NAVAIR    Naval Air (Systems Command) 
NAVICP    Naval Inventory Control Point 
NWCF     Naval Working Capital Fund 
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OEM     Original Equipment Manager 
O Level Maintenance   Operational Level Maintenance 
O&M     Operations and Maintenance  
OPTEMPO    Operational Tempo 
OSD     Office of the Secretary of Defense 
PBL     Performance Based Logistics 
PGCS     Portable Ground Control Station 
PGDT     Portable Ground Data Terminal 
PM     Program Manager  
POL     Petroleum, Oil, & Lubricants 
POP     Plug-In Optical Payload 
QDR     Quadrennial Defense Review 
RCM     Reliability Centered Maintenance 
RDT&E    Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation 
RFI     Ready For Issue 
ROI     Return On Investment 
RSTA Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target 
Acquisition 
RVT     Remote Video Terminal 
SDLM     Standard Depot Level Maintenance 
SE     Support Equipment 
TALS     Tactical Automatic Landing System 
TAT      Turn Around Time 
 90
TD     Technical Directive 
T     Time 
TLCC     Total Life Cycle Cost 
TLCSM    Total Life Cycle Systems Management 
TOC     Total Ownership Cost 
UAV     Unmanned Air Vehicle 
UPS     Uninterruptible Power Supply 
VTUAV Vertical (Take-Off and Landing) Tactical 
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